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Bankruptcy
Judge Louis M. Phillips*
DianeSciacca*"

I. PROPERTY OF THE BANKRUPTCY ESTATE AND EXEMPTION: ERISA PENSION
AND WELFARE PLANS

Recently the United States Supreme Court answered a question that had
perplexed federal courts (bankruptcy, district, appellate), debtors, and creditors
nationwide: whether a debtor's interest in his or her Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) qualified retirement plan becomes property of the
debtor's bankruptcy estate.' This section of the paper will discuss the genesis of
the question, the jurisprudential wrestling therewith, and the resolution. In addition,
the Supreme Court resolution will be slightly knocked, and this writer will (finally)
offer observations as to the effect of the resolution upon the continued viability of
certain Louisiana exemption statutes.
A. The Statutory Problem

Section 541 (a) of the Bankruptcy Code establishes that the bankruptcy estate
is created by the commencement of a bankruptcy case and sets out what property
comprises the estate.2 Bolstering section 541(a) is section 541(c)(1), which is

Copyright 1994, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
*

United States Bankruptcy Judge, Middle District of Louisiana; Adjunct Professor of Law,

Louisiana State University Law Center, Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
Vast appreciation is extended to Marlene C. Stubbs, my secretary (nay, "Judicial Assistant"), for
her unflagging efforts in transcription (and translation of my formless, unreadable script).
Note: all references to "this writer" are limited to Louis M. Phillips (by agreement with Ms.
Sciacca, she should be spared any fallout).
**
B.A., University of Illinois, 1989; J.D., Loyola University of Chicago School of Law. 1993;
Member, Illinois Bar. Ms. Sciacca is currently the law clerk for Judge Phillips.
1. Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242 (1992).
2. Section 541(a) provides:
The commencement of acase under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title creates an estate.
Such estate is comprised of all the following property, wherever located and by whomever
held:
(1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)(2) of this section, all legal or
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.
(2) All interests of the debtor and the debtor's spouse in community property as of
the commencement of the case that is(A) under the sole, equal, or joint management and control of the debtor; or
(B) liable for an allowable claim against the debtor, or for both an allowable
claim against the debtor and an allowable claim against the debtor's spouse, to
the extent that such interest is so liable.
(3) Any interest in property that the trustee recovers under section 329(b), 363(n),
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preemptive of applicable nonbankruptcy law and agreements that purport to restrict
transfer of property. 3 Section 541(c)(1) also provides that notwithstanding such
agreements or nonbankruptcy law, property subject thereto becomes property of the
bankruptcy estate.4 This section is limited, however, by section 541(c)(2), which
provides that:
A restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust
that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in
a case under this title.5
This exception to the preemptive section 541 (c)(1) has the effect of excluding
a beneficial interest in a spendthrift trust from property of the estate, to the extent
the interest is subject to enforceable restrictions
on transfer (anti-alienation
6
provisions) under the controlling state law.

543, 550, 553, or 723 of this title.
(4) Any interest in property preserved for the benefit of or ordered transferred to the
estate under section 510(c) or 551 of this title.
(5) Any interest in property that would have been property of the estate if such
interest had been an interest of the debtor on the date of the filing of the petition, and
that the debtor acquires or becomes entitled to acquire within 180 days after such
date(A) by bequest, devise, or inheritance;
(B) as a result of a property settlement agreement with the debtor's spouse, or
of an interlocutory or final divorce decree; or
(C) as a beneficiary of a life insurance policy or of a death benefit plan.
(6) Proceeds, product, offspring, rents, or profits of or from property of the estate,
except such as are earnings from services performed by an individual debtor after the
commencement of the case.
(7) Any interest in property that the estate acquires after the commencement of the
case.

11 U.S.C. § 541 (1988).
3. Section 541(c)(1) provides as follows:
Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, an interest of the debtor in
property becomes property of the estate under subsection (a)(]), (a)(2), or (a)(5) of this
section notwithstanding any provision in an agreement, transfer instrument, or applicable
nonbankruptcy law(A) that restricts or conditions transfer of such interest by the debtor; or
(B) that is conditioned on the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor, on the
commencement of a case under this title, or on the appointment of or taking
possession by a trustee in a case under this title or a custodian before such commencement, and that effects or gives an option to effect a forfeiture, modification, or
termination of the debtor's interest in property.
11 U.S.C. § 541 (1988).
4. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 99 S. Ct. 914 (1978); Board of Trade of the City
of Chicago v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 1, 44 S. Ct. 232 (1924); State of California v. Farmers Market, Inc.
(In re Farmers Markets), 792 F.2d 1400 (9th Cir. 1986).
5. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1988).
6. See, e.g., Daniel v. Security Pacific Nat'l Bank (In re Daniel), 771 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016; 106 S. Ct. 1099 (1986); Lichstrahl v. Bankers Trust (In re

1994]

BANKRUPTCY

The question bound to arise, of course, is whether section 541 (c)(2) should be
limited in application to spendthrift trusts settled under state law or be viewed
expansively as applicable to "trusts" established by federal law that, while the
beneficial interests might well7be subject to transfer restrictions, would not qualify
as state law spendthrift trusts.
B. JurisprudentialWrangling
The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Goff,8 as a matter of first
impression, faced the question of whether a debtor's interest in a self-employed
Keogh Plan, qualified under ERISA 9 and subject to 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13)10 and
29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(l),"1 was included in the debtor's bankruptcy estate. The
Goffs, individual debtors, sought to exclude their interest in self-employed Keogh
Plans from their Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate under section 541(c)(2), asserting that
the anti-alienation provisions of 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) constituted a restriction on
transfer of their beneficial interest in an ERISA "trust," which was enforceable
under applicable bankruptcy law. 2 Refusing to approve a settlement of the
question between the Goffs and their trustee, the bankruptcy court held that the

Lichstrahl), 750 F.2d 1488 (1lth Cir. 1985); Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 726 F.2d 1268 (8th
Cir. 1984); Goff v. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983).
7. The term "trust" is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code.
8. 706 F.2d 574.
9. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
10. 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13) (1988) reads:
(13) Assignment and alienation.(A) In general.-A trust shall not constitute a qualified trust under this section unless
the plan of which such trust is a part provides that benefits provided under the plan
may not be assigned or alienated. For purposes of the preceding sentence, there shall
not be taken into account any voluntary and revocable assignment of not to exceed 10
percent of any benefit payment made by any participant who is receiving benefits
under the plan unless the assignment or alienation is made for purposes of defraying
plan administration costs. For purposes of this paragraph a loan made to a participant
or beneficiary shall not be treated as an assignment or alienation if such loan is
secured by the participant's accrued nonforfeitable benefit and is exempt from the tax
imposed by section 4975 (relating to tax on prohibited transactions) by reason of
section 4975(d)(1). This paragraph shall take effect on January 1, 1976 and shall not
apply to assignments which were irrevocable on September 2, 1974.
(B) Special rulesfor domestic relationsorders.- Subparagraph (A) shall apply to the
creation, assignment, or recognition of a right to any benefit payable with respect to
a participant pursuant to a domestic relations order, except that subparagraph (A) shall
not apply if the order is determined to be a qualified domestic relations order.
11. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1988) reads:
(d) Assignment or alienation ofplan benefits
(1) Each pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under the plan may not be
assigned or alienated.
12. Goff, 706 F.2d at 576-77.
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entirety of the debtors' interest in the Keogh Plan was property of their
bankruptcy
13
estate and was therefore to be liquidated to pay claims of creditors.
On direct appeal from the bankruptcy court, the Fifth Circuit affirmed,
concluding that Congress, in enacting section 541(c)(2), did not intend the
provision to extend to ERISA-qualified plans, but intended "a limited exemption
for 'spendthrift trusts,' as defined by reference to state law." The court further held
that because the Goffs' pension plan did not qualify under applicable (Texas) law
as a spendthrift trust, the corpus of the plan was to be included in the bankruptcy
14
estate.
To reach its conclusion, the court employed the following analysis:
First, we examine the explicitly narrow legislative intent behind the
facially broad reference in section 541(c)(2) to "applicable bankruptcy
law." Second, we consider the overall congressional scheme embodied
in the Bankruptcy Code, particularly the exemption system election
provision, Section 522, which directly addresses the degree to which
pensions may therein be exempted and also explicitly references "Federal
law" and ERISA. Third, we assess the relationship and effect upon
ERISA of the intent of the Bankruptcy Code .... 15
Resorting to the scant legislative history underlying section 541(c)(2), the court
noted that the only explicative references are those made to the debtor's beneficial
interest in a "spendthrift trust."' 6 The court concluded, upon these limited
references, that "Congress intended by its reference to 'applicable nonbankruptcy
law' to exempt from the estate only those 'spendthrift trusts' traditionally beyond
the reach of creditors under state law. This provision carries over from the old Act
the previously recognized exemption for spendthrift trusts."' 7

13. Id. at 577.
14. Id. at 589.
15. Id. at 581.
16. Id. at 581-82 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 369 (1977), reprintedin
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6325).
The Goff court relied upon the House report analysis of the intent of section 541(c)(2), which
states:
Subsection (c) [of Section 5411 invalidates restrictions on the transfer of property of the
debtor, in order that all of the interests of the debtor in property will become property of
the estate ....
Paragraph(2) of subsection (c), however, preserves restrictions on
transfer of a spendthrift trust to the extent that the restriction is enforceable under
applicable nonbankruptcy law.
(emphasis in opinion). The court further noted:
The bill also continues over the exclusion from property of the estate of the debtor's
interest in a spendthrift trust to the extent the trust is protected from creditors under
applicable State law. The bankruptcy of the beneficiary should not be permitted to defeat
the legitimate expectations of the settlor of the trust.
Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 176 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 6136) (emphasis in opinion) (footnote omitted).
17. Id. at 582 (citing In re Witlin, 640 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1981) (recognition, under the
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The more complicated leg of the court's analysis is leg two, consideration of
the exemption sections and references therein to federal law and ERISA.' Unlike
section 70 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (the predecessor to section 541), which
excluded property "held to be exempt" from the estate, 9 the mechanics of the
Bankruptcy Code cause all property covered by section 54 1(a) to come into the
to being exempted out of the estate by the debtor's claims of
estate, subject
2

exemption. 0 The substantive bankruptcy exemption scheme is found in section

522. Two subsections of section 522, 522(b) and (d)(10), are applicable to this
discussion. Under section 522(b), 2' individual debtors are entitled to elect

applicable prior Act, that spendthrift trusts were exempt pursuant to state trust law)).
18. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
19. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Section 70(a), 11 U.S.C. § 110.
20. See, e.g., Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305, 111 S. Ct. 1833 (1991) (holding that an estate in
bankruptcy consists of all the interests in property, legal and equitable, possessed by the debtor at
the time of filing, as well as those interests recovered or recoverable through transfer and lien
avoidance provision); Larson v. Camerone (In re Larson), 147 B.R. 39 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1992);
Lonstein v. Rockman (In re Lonstein), 950 F.2d 77 (1st Cir. 1991) (recognizing that § 541(a)(1)
includes "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the
case" as property of the estate); Brandt v. Woodlawn Auto Workers (In re Bradt), 757 F.2d 512 (2d
Cir. 1985); In re Wilson, 694 F.2d 236 (11th Cir. 1982); In re Linderman, 20 B.R. 826 (Bankr. W.D.
Wash. 1982); Bush Gardens Inc. v. United States, 10 B.R. 506 (Bankr. N.J. 1979); In re Ford, 3 B.R.
559 (Bankr. D. Md. 1980); H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 367-68 (1977), reprinted in
1978 U.S.S.C.A.N. 5963, 6323-24 (stating that § 541(a)(1) includes all kinds of property, including
tangible or intangible property, causes of action, and all other forms of property currently specified
in § 70a of the Bankruptcy Act); S. Rep. No. 989,95th Cong., 2d Sess. 82-3 (1978) (same), reprinted
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5787, 5868; H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d session 367 (1977),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.S.C.A.N. 5963, 6323-24; 4 Collier on Bankruptcy 541.06, at 541-28 to 29,
1 541.08, at 541-41 (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th ed. 1992). See also United States v. Whiting
Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 205 n.9, 103 S. Ct. 2309, 2313 n.9 (1983) (determining that the scope of
§ 541(a)(1) is broad and pervasive); Garner v. Strauss (In re Garner), 952 F.2d 232 (8th Cir. 1991);
Humphrey v. Buckley (In re Swanson), 873 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1989).
21. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1988) provides:
(b) Notwithstanding section 541 of this title, an individual debtor may exempt from
property of the estate the property listed in either paragraph (1) or, in the alternative,
paragraph (2) of this subsection. In joint cases filed under section 302 of this title and
individual cases filed under section 301 or 303 of this title by or against debtors who are
husband and wife, and whose estates are ordered to be jointly administered under Rule
1015(b) of the Bankruptcy Rules, one debtor may not elect to exempt property listed in
paragraph (1)and the other debtor elect to exempt property listed in paragraph (2) of this
subsection. If the parties cannot agree on the alternative to be elected, they shall be
deemed to elect paragraph (1), where such election is permitted under the law of the
jurisdiction where the case is filed. Such property is(1) property that is specified under subsection (d)of this section, unless the State law
that is applicable to the debtor under paragraph (2)(A) of this subsection specifically
does not so authorize; or, in the alternative.
(2) (A) any property that is exempt under Federal law, other than subsection (d) of
this section, or State or local law that is applicable on the date of the filing of the
petition at the place in which the debtor's domicile has been located for the 180 days
immediately preceding the date of the filing of the petition, or for a longer portion of
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between the federal exemptions found in section 522(d) and applicable state law
exemptions, unless the state law exemption scheme does not authorize such an
election. If the applicable state law exemption statute requires that a debtor claim
exemptions under state law, the state can be said to have "opted out" of the federal
exemption scheme established by section 522(d). Debtors within these "opt out"
states may claim both the state exemptions and exemptions covering "any property
that is exempt under Federal law, other than subsection (d) of this section. 22 The
legislative history of section 522(b) contains an illustrative list of other federal
laws, the benefits of which may be exempted under section 522(b)(2)(A):
-Foreign Service Retirement and Disability payments, 22 U.S.C. § 1104
[Foreign Relations and Intercourse];
-Social security payments, 42 U.S.C. § 407 [The Public Health and
Welfare];
-Injury or death compensation payments from war risk hazards, 42
U.S.C. § 1717;
-Wages of fishermen, seamen, and apprentices, 46 U.S.C. § 601 [Shipping];
-Civil service retirement benefits, 5 U.S.C. §§ 729, 2265 [Government
Organization and Employees];
-Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act death and
disability benefits, 33 U.S.C. § 916 [Navigation and Navigable Waters];
-Railroad Retirement Act annuities and pensions, 45 U.S.C. § 23 1m
[former section 228(L) of Title 45, Railroads];
-Veterans benefits, 45 U.S.C. § 352(E);
-Special pensions paid to winners of the Congressional Medal of Honor,
38 U.S.C. § 3101 [Veterans' Benefits]; and
-Federal homestead lands on debts contracted before issuance of the
patent, 43 U.S.C. § 175 [Public Lands].23
The other relevant provision, 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E), 24 allows an

such 180-day period than in any other place; and
(B) any interest in property in which the debtor had, immediately before the
commencement of the case, an interest as a tenant by the entirety or joint tenant to the
extent that such interest as a tenant by the entirety or joint tenant is exempt from
process under applicable nonbankruptcy law.
22. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) (1988).
23. S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (1978). reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5861; H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 360 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6316.
24. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) (1988) reads:
(10) The debtor's right to receive(E) apayment under a stock bonus, pension, profitsharing, annuity, or similar plan or
contract on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service, to the extent
reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor,
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individual debtor, who chooses the federal exemption scheme, to exempt the right
to receive payments under ERISA plans "to the extent reasonably necessary for the
support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor," as long as, interalia, the
plan is qualified for favorable tax treatment under the Internal Revenue Code.
The Goffs had claimed their exemptions under Texas state law (which at that
time had no provision for exemption of retirement plans), but did not claim that the
retirement plans at issue were exempt under section 522(b)(2)(A).25 Given the
failure of the Goffs to claim an exemption, the only vehicle available as of the
proceeding in bankruptcy court, and in the opinion of the Fifth Circuit, was
exclusion from the estate under section 541(c)(2).26 Though the applicability of
the exemption section was not "directly involved in this appeal,"" the Goff court
plunged into the exemption thicket, seeking further evidence concerning whether
Congress intended the reference to "applicable nonbankruptcy law" within section
541(c)(2) to extend to the federal law comprising ERISA.
Immediately apparent to the court was the fact that ERISA is not found within
the illustrative listing of federal laws found in the legislative history underlying
section 522(b)(2)(A).2" While wary of drawing the negative inference of
exclusion through silence,29 the court posited a two-fold distinction between the
listed federal laws and ERISA:
1. The statutes referred to in the legislative history contain express
prohibition on alienation, voluntary or involuntary, while the ERISA antiassignment and alienation provisions are "contingent" in nature ("ERISA
merely provides that as a conditionofobtainingqualifiedstatus-with its
attendant tax and other benefits-a pension plan must preclude alienation
or assignment of its benefits").30
2. The property interests covered are also different in nature ... the
privatepension and welfare benefits sweepingly regulatedby ERISA
differ considerably from the publicfunded and/or createdpension and

unless(i) such plan or contract was established by or under the auspices of an insider
that employed the debtor at the time the debtor's rights under such plan or
contract arose;
(ii) such payment is on account of age or length of service; and
(iii) such plan or contract does not qualify under section 401(a), 403(a), 403(b),
408, or 409 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C. 401(a), 403(a),
403(b), 408, or 409).
25. Goff v. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574, 582 (5th Cir. 1983).
26. Id. at 587. Under the present state of the law, a debtor may amend a claim of exemptions
at any time before the case is closed when undue prejudice will result. Zielinsky v. Hill (In re Hill),
972 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1992); In re Herzog, 118 B.R. 529 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990); In re Luna, 100
B.R. 605 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989).
27. Goff, 706 F.2d at 582.
28. Id. at 585.
29. Id.
30. Id. (emphasis in original).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

welfare systems, or thefew exceptional,
traditionallyguardedindustries
31
covered by the illustrative listings.").
Additionally, the court noted that specific reference is made to ERISAqualified plans within section 522(d)(10)(E).32 The court concluded that when
drafting the Bankruptcy Code, Congress was aware of ERISA and referred
specifically to it when intending to include ERISA benefits into an exemption
scheme (section 522(d)(10)(E)), and in its reference to other "Federal law" within
section 522(b)(2)(A), Congress intended that the "narrow characteristics of the
cited statutes ... was [sic] intended as the operative thread by which the federal
statutes-overlooked or yet to be enacted-might be included. 33 Therefore,
though not necessary to its ultimate holding, the court concluded that "Congress did
not intend to include ERISA-qualified plans within the other 'Federal law'
exception of the Section 522 election provision. 34
Melding the two-legged analysis (and section 541(c)(2) with section 522), the
court read section 541(c)(2) in light of its interpretation of the legislative history of
section 522. Congress mentioned federal pension law and ERISA particularly
when it intended to, but did not do so in section 541(c)(2). Moreover, Congress
took ERISA into consideration when it drafted section 522, "and did not grant a
broad exemption," thereby evidencing its intent to insulate pensions created by
federal law "only to the extent recognized by Section 522." 35 Further, while the
preemption provisions of ERISA36 require that ERISA preempt state law, ERISA
is not to be preemptive of other federal law (except for those limited exceptions
referred to in the statute itself).37 The intent underlying the promulgation of the
Bankruptcy Code (with respect to sections 541 and 522) was to expand the
bankruptcy estate and to limit exemption of ERISA benefits from the estate.3

31.
32.
33.

Id. at 586 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
Id. at 587.
Id. at 586

34.

Id.

35. Id.
36. One of the preemptive provisions of ERISA relevant to this discussion is 29 U.S.C. §
1144(a) (1988), which reads:
(a) Supersedure; effective date
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this subchapter
and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they
may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of
this title and not exempt under section 1003(b) of this title. This section shall take effect
on January 1, 1975.
37. Goff, 706 F.2d at 586. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (1988), which reads:
(d) Alteration, amendment, modification, invalidation, impairment, or supersedure of any
law of United States prohibited

Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair,
or supersede any law of the United States (except as provided in sections 1031 and
1137(b) of this title) or any rule or regulation issued under any such law.
38. Goff, 706 F.2d at 586.
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"These policy-based provisions of the Code would be frustrated were ERISA's
39
anti-alienation and assignment provisions applied with a sweeping brush."
Completing its analysis, the court concluded that the Keogh Plan at issue did
not qualify as a spendthrift trust under applicable Texas law, and, therefore, the
retirement plan became property of the Goffs' bankruptcy estate, to be used to pay
the claims of creditors. 40
Subsequent to Goff, the Fifth Circuit extended its reasoning to municipal
pension plans, 4' a vested interest in an ERISA-qualified trust settled by covering
a group of physicians, 42 annuities established under a group master plan,443 and
again to self-settled trusts established by professionals.4
The Dyke case represents an interesting reflection on Goff. Recall the
complicated second leg of the Goff analysis, which attempted to show that where
Congress intended to refer to ERISA, it did (section 522(d)(10)(E)), and where it
intended to exclude ERISA (the legislative references to other federal laws), it was
silent. Utilizing clarifying hindsight, the court in Dyke reformed its analysis of the
interplay between section 541(c)(2) and section 522(d)(10)(E) and purported to
make clear what was on its mind when Goff was conceived. The Dyke court
opined:
As we recognized in In re Goff, the federal exemption scheme in the
Bankruptcy Code authorizes the exemption of funds in ERISA retirement
plans. 706 F.2d at 585. If Congress had intended in section 541(c)(2) to
exclude ERISA plans from the bankruptcy estate, then Congress would
not have authorized the federal exemption of such plans. Id.at 582. Thus,
the Court in In re Goff attempted to avoid an interpretation of ERISA
which would have rendered superfluous the federal exemption of
retirement plans: the Court concluded that ERISA section 541 (c)(2) does
not exclude retirement plans from the bankruptcy estate unless they
qualify under state law as a "spendthrift trust." Id. at 587. 45
The Goff holding was embraced by several circuit courts, which not only
followed the holding of Goff,but effectively reiterated its reasoning as their own.46

39. Id. at 587.
40. Id. at 589.
41. Reagan v. Austin Municipal Fed. Credit Union (In re Reagan), 741 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1984).
42. Brooks v. Interfirst Bank (In re Brooks), 844 F.2d 258 (5th Cir. 1988).'
43. Johnson v. Fenslage (In re Johnson), 724 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir. 1984).
44. Heitkamp v. Dyke (In re Dyke), 943 F.2d 1435 (5th Cir. 1991) (physicians and an
attorney).
45. In re Dyke, 943 F.2d at 1442-43 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original). Though
omitted above, part of footnote 20 is worthy of repeating: "Ifthis Court were to conclude that all
retirement plans are excluded from the bankruptcy estate under section 541(c)(2), then we would
render Bankruptcy Code section 522(d)(10)(E), which authorizes the exemption of retirement plans,
mere surplusage .
I..."
id.
at 1443 n. 20. It seems almost as though the court in Dyke believed that
if this statutory observation were repeated enough, it would somehow show up in Goff.
46. See Daniel v. Security Pacific Nat'l Bank (In re Daniel), 771 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1985),
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However, acclaim was not universal. There developed a divergent line of circuit
court authority repudiating Goff and its focus on legislative history. In adherence
to a pledge of allegiance to interpretation of statutes according to their "plain
meaning," this authority maintained that the phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy law"
within section 541(c)(2) "means exactly what it says: all laws, state and federal,
under which a transfer restriction is enforceable."47
Specifically, the courts adopting the "excluded from the estate" interpretation
succinctly address the two primary arguments of Goff(perhaps as enhanced by
Dyke), that Congress would have specifically mentioned federal law within section
541(c)(2) if the section was intended to refer to ERISA-qualified plans and that
excluding retirement plans from the estate under section 541(c)(2) would render
section 522(d)(10)(E) meaningless (though the courts do mention the irrelevance
of such an analysis, given the plain wording of the statute).
First, the courts adverse to Goff note that the phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy
law" used in other sections of the Code (sections 108, 365(n), 1125) clearly refers
to both state and federal law.48 Second, the reference to "a payment under a stock
bonus, pension, profit sharing.., or similar plan '49 is to be distinguished from the
corpus of the plan itself. "Even if pension plan assets in the hands of a [plan]
trustee are beyond reach of creditors because not part of the debtor's estate under
section 541(c)(2), distributions made from the plan to the debtor would not enjoy
50
such protection, in the absence of exemption under section 522(d)(10)(E).
Moreover, the anti-Goff cases assert, exclusion of ERISA-qualified benefits from
the bankruptcy estate harmonizes ERISA with the Bankruptcy Code."'
C. The Resolution
53
52
The Supreme Court in Pattersonv. Shumate affirmed the Fourth Circuit
and held that a debtor's interest in an ERISA-qualified retirement plan is excluded
from the bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2). Referring to the "plain
language of the Bankruptcy Code and ERISA" as "our determinant," noting that
"[n]othing in section 541 suggests that the phrase 'applicable nonbankruptcy law'
refers ... exclusively to state law" and that "the text contains no limitation on

cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016, 106 S. Ct. 1199 (1986); Lichstrahl v. Bankers Trust (hi re Lichstrahl),
750 F.2d 1488 (1lth Cir. 1985); Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984).
47. Anderson v. Raine (In re Moore), 907 F.2d 1476, 1477 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Gladwell
v. Harline (In re Harline), 950 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1991); Velis v. Kardanis, 949 F.2d 78 (3d Cir.
1991); Shumate v. Patterson, 943 F.2d 362 (4th Cir. 1991), affid, Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct.
2242 (1992); Forbes v. Lucas (In re Lucas), 924 F.2d 597 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied 111 S. Ct.
2275 (1991).
48. In re Harline, 950 F.2d at 674; Velis, 949 F.2d at 81-82.
49. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) (1988).
50. Velis, 949 F.2d at 81-82.
51. In re Harline, 950 F.2d at 675-76; Shumate, 943 F.2d at 365.
52. 112 S. Ct. 2242 (1992).
53. Shumate, 943 F.2d 362.
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'applicable nonbankruptcy law' relating to the source of the text,"54 the Court
eschewed resort to legislative history (chiding the appellate courts who so resorted
as having "misconceived the appropriate analytical task").5"
Turning the Goff analysis on its head, the Supreme Court (offering its
perspective on how to read the Code as a textual whole) noted that "[t]he Code
reveals, significantly, that Congress, when it desired to do so, knew how to restrict
the scope of applicable law to 'state law' and did so with some frequency." 6
The Court also pointed out that the phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy law"
found in other Code sections encompasses both state and federal law, citing MorrisKnudsen ConstructionCo. v. Director,OWCP,57 as "recognizing the principal
'that a word is presumed to have the same meaning in all subsections of the same
58
statute.'
Responding to the argument that excluding ERISA-qualified plans under
section 541(c)(2) renders section 522(d)(10)(E) superfluous, 59 the Court concluded that "§ 522(d)(10)(E) exempts from the bankruptcy estate a much broader
category of interests than §541(c)(2) excludes," 6 and therefore that section
522(d)(10)(e) is not rendered meaningless.
Finally, the Court harmonized its decision with what it views as the relevant
"policy considerations." Citing Butner v. United States6' and Guidry v. Sheet

54. Patterson, 112 S. Ct. at 2246.
55. Id. at 2248 n.4.
56. Id. at 2246. Examples offered by the Patterson Court include: "11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2)
(entity may be adebtor under chapter 9 if authorized 'by State law'); 11 U.S.C. §522(b)(1) (election
of exemptions controlled by 'the State law that is applicable to the debtor'); I1 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)
(a debt for alimony, maintenance, or support determined 'in accordance with State or territorial law'
is not dischargeable); 11 U.S.C. § 903(1) ('a State law prescribing a method of composition of
indebtedness' of municipalities is not binding on nonconsenting creditors)." Id. at 2246.
57. 461 U.S. 624, 103 S. Ct. 2045 (1983).
58. Patterson, 112 S. Ct. at 2247 n.2 (citing Morris-Knudsen Constr. Co. v. Director, OWCP,
461 U.S. 624, 633, 1035 S.Ct. 2045, 2050 (1983)). This reference apparently fuels the concurrence
of Justice Scalia, who does some chiding of his own: "This application of a normal and obvious
principle of statutory construction would not merit comment, except that we explicitly rejected it, in
favor of aone-subsection-at-a-time approach, when interpreting another provision of this very statute
earlier this Term." Id. at 2251 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773,
777-78 n.3 (1992) (stating that "we express no opinion as to whether the words [at issue] have
different meaning in other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.").
59. See discussion supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text and infra note 66 and
accompanying text.
60. Patterson, 112 S. Ct. at 2249. The Court refers, for example, to plans "established by
governmental entities and churches" as not being necessarily covered by the anti-alienation provision
of ERISA in order to be "qualified" plans, citing 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(l) and (2); 26 CFR 1-401(a)13(a) (1991); and Individual Retirement Accounts (26 U.S.C. § 408) as exemptible under §
522(d)(10)(E), but not excluded from the estate under § 541(c)(2). Id.
61. 440 U.S. 48, 55, 99 S. Ct. 914, 918 (1978) (stating that "uniform treatment of property
interests prevents a party from receiving a 'windfall merely by reason of the happenstance of
bankruptcy ... "') (citing Lewis v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 364 U.S. 603, 609, 81 S. Ct. 347, 350
(1961)).
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Metal Workers PensionFund,62 the PattersonCourt refused to endorse a policy
which would preclude involuntary alienation of ERISA-qualified pension plans
outside of bankruptcy but would require, in essence, involuntary alienation of such
plans inside bankruptcy (if plans are not excluded from the estate).63 Rather, "our
decision today ensures that the treatment of pension benefits will not vary based
upon the beneficiary's bankruptcy status."'
From the foregoing, it is fairly simple to encapsulate the Court's holding: an
individual debtor's interest in a retirement plan, the qualification of which under
ERISA is subject to the anti-alienation provisions of ERISA and which is in fact
qualified on the basis of required anti-alienation language contained within the plan
document, is excluded from the debtor's bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. §
541(c)(2).65 If a debtor's interest is excluded from the estate, the issue of whether
the debtor's interest is exempt under 11 U.S.C. § 522 is irrelevant (or moot).6
Before moving to a discussion of certain implications of and questions raised
by Patterson(e.g., the issue of the validity of certain portions of the Louisiana
exemption laws 67), an alternative approach to the interpretation of the interplay
between section 541(c) and section 522 is offered, one which was not dealt with by
the Court in Patterson(or by the courts
in Goff and its progeny), and which
6
provides support for the Goffholding.
D. Knocking at the Resolution
Recall that section 522(b)(2)(A) allows the individual debtor in an "opt out
state" to claim an exemption on "any property that is exempt under federal law,
other than subsection (d) of this section," along with any exemption provided under
applicable state or local law. 69 Recall also that the Goff court, analyzing the
legislative history behind section 522(b)(2)(A) (the illustrative listing of federal
laws providing exemptions under this subsection), concluded that, in light of the
specific references to retirement plans subject to ERISA within section

62. 493 U.S. 365, 110 S.Ct. 680 (1990) (finding that "labor union may not impose constructive
trust or pension benefits of union officials who breach fiduciary duties and embezzled funds").
63. Patterson,112 S. Ct. at 2249-50.
64. Id. at 2249.
65. In a recently decided case, McGraw v. Society Bank &Trust (In re Bell & Beckwith), 5
F.3d 150 (6th Cir. 1993), the Sixth Circuit held that contributions which are in excess of those
provided for under a partnership ERISA-qualified profit sharing plan (because, for example, the
partnership earned no net income-profits) are "void ab initio"; are not valid contributions to the
plan, and, therefore, because such contributions never became part of the plan, are not subject to the
anti-alienation provisions of 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d). Id. at 153.
66. Patterson, 112 S.Ct. at 2250.
67. Particularly, La. R.S. 13:3881(D)(1), (2)(1990) and La. R.S. 20:33(1) (1983). For full text,
see infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
68. In anticipation of the question, "Why is this writer wasting space on an argument contrary
to the final word-a Supreme Court opinion?," this writer can only respond, "This is a law school
faculty symposium, isn't it?"
69. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) (1988).
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522(d)(10)(E) and the failure to mention ERISA within the legislative history of
section 522(b)(2)(A), ERISA was not a federal law providing an exemption under
that subsection. Additionally, the court extended its analysis (perhaps by a
jump) to conclude that because "Congress made reference to federal law and
pension benefits when such a characterization was intended," and was "well aware
of ERISA... and did not grant a broad exemption" in section 522, "[t]he only
reasonable inference is that Congress intended that pensions provided for by federal
law be insulated from bankruptcy only to the extent recognized in section 522."7
Did the court miss a step? Perhaps. Especially in light of the requirement of
initial focus upon the wording of the statute espoused by the Supreme Court in
Patterson,72the Fifth Circuit in Goff conceivably resorted to legislative history too
quickly in its analysis of section 541(c) and somewhat confusedly in its analysis of
section 522.
Though the court noted that section 522(b)(2)(A) only refers to "federal law
other than subsection (d)" ' 1 3 and that the legislative history provides only
illustrative guidance, 4 the court simultaneously referred to what Congress
"clearly did not do directly in section 522, although section 522 explicitly addresses
the extent to which other 'Federal law' and retirement benefit exemptions would
be recognized."75 The problem with the court's approach is that legislative history
is resorted to as the basis for the court's conclusion as to what section 522 clearly
and explicitly addresses and does. As the PattersonCourt teaches, this clearly will
not do. What about an approach that recognizes that the Goffcourt might have had
something but did not know what? Let us see.
Clearly, statutes within a scheme (or Code) are to be interpreted, if possible,
so that the reading of one statute does not create conflict with other provisions or
render other provisions redundant, meaningless, or superfluous.7 6 The Supreme

70. Goff v. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574, 585-86 (5th Cir. 1983).
71. Id. at 586.
72. Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242, 2246, 2248 n.4 (1992).
73. Goff, 706 F.2d at 582.
74. Id. at 583.
75. Id. at 582 (emphasis supplied).
76. Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 112 S. Ct. 1146, 1149 (1992) (holding that a statute
should be construed in a manner which brings all of its provisions into harmony); Guidry v. Sheet
Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 376, 110 S. Ct. 680, 687 (1990) (same); Louisiana
Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 370, 106 S. Ct. 1890, 1899 (1986); Morton v. Mancari,
417 U.S. 535, 551, 94 S. Ct. 2474, 2483 (1974); Federal Power Comm'n v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe
Line, Co., 337 U.S. 498, 514, 69 S. Ct. 1251, 1260 (1949) (holding that all sections of the Natural
Gas Act must be reconciled if possible so as to produce a symmetrical whole); United Steelworkers
v. North Star Steel Co., Inc., 5 F.3d 39, 43 (3d Cir. 1993) (deciding that a statute's provisions should
be read to be consistent with one another); Coar v. Kazimir, 990 F.2d 1413, 1419-20 (3d Cir. 1993)
(same), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 179 (1993); FDIC v. Hirsch (In re Colonial Realty Co.), 980 F.2d
125, 132 (2d Cir. 1992) (opining that in addressing arguably inconsistent requirements of two
statutes, the courts must give effect to both where possible); United States v. Gordon, 961 F.2d 426,
431 (3d Cir. 1992) (determining that "[clourts should attempt to reconcile two seemingly conflicting
statutory provisions whenever possible"); Atwell v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 670 F.2d 272, 286

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

Court has often resorted to legislative history when, notwithstanding the apparent
plain meaning of a statute, attributing such meaning would contravene a consistent
reading of the statute as a whole 77 or be directly contrary to clearly expressed
legislative intent.78 Now, to the statute at hand.
The Court in Pattersonwas clearly satisfied that its reading of section 541(c)
did not render section 522(d)(10)(E) surplusage, though the effect of the opinion
was to limit the applicability of section 522(d)(10)(E) drastically. 79 What about
the "other federal law" provision of section 522(b)(2)(A)? The Court did not
address this question and neither did the court in Goff. Secondly, should the Court
in Pattersonhave been so self-assured in its harmonizing of section 541(c)(2) and
section 522(d)(10)(E)?
Adhering to the espoused penchant for "words only" if the meaning is plain,
the first question is whether the meaning of the federal exemption component of

(D.C. App. 1981) (stating that "it is a court's mission to reconcile arguably contradictory statutory
passages where the intent of Congress is clear but implementation is somewhat faulty, and such
passages should be construed whenever possible to achieve consistency"); United States v.Tighe, 551
F.2d 18, 20 (3d Cir. 1977) (same), cert. denied,434 U.S. 823, 98 S.Ct. 68 (1977); In re Nadler, 122
B.R. 162 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990) (same).
77. See Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 157, 110 S.Ct. 997, 1001 (1990) (stating that
in determining a statute's meaning, the court must look to the statutes language as well as the design
and object of the statute as a whole); K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291, 108 S.Ct.
1811, 1818 (1988) (same); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51, 107 S. Ct. 1549, 1555
(1987); Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650, 94 S. Ct. 2431 2436 (1974) (holding that "[w]hen
'interpreting a statute, the court will not look merely to a particular clause in which general words
may be used, but will take in connection with it the whole statute and the objects and policy of the
law ... "') (citing Brown v. Duchesne, 19 How. 183 (1857)); Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1,
11, 82 S. Ct. 585, 591-92 (1962) (same); Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713, 95 S.Ct. 1893,
1898 (1975); Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians v. FPC, 420 U.S. 395, 402-03, 95 S.Ct. 1066, 1071-72
(1975); United States v. Heirs of Boisdore, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 113, 122 (1849); accord, United States
Nat'l Bank of Oregon v. Independent Ins. Agents of America, Inc., 113 S.Ct. 2173, 2182 (1993);
King v. St. Vincent's Hospital, 112 S.Ct. 570, 574 (1991); Dole v. United Steelworkers, 494 U.S.
26, 35, 110 S. Ct. 929, 934 (1990); Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 151, 157, 93 S.Ct.
408, 413 (1972).
78. See Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 4421, 433 n.12,
107 S.Ct. 1207, 1214 n.12 (1987) (noting that the Court looks to the legislative history to determine
whether there is "clearly expressed legislative intention" contrary to the language of the statute);
United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 606, 106 S.Ct. 3116, 3121 (1986) (same); Consumer Prod.
Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 2056 (1980); Cass v.
United States, 417 U.S. 72, 77, 94 S.Ct. 2167, 2170-71 (1974); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v.
National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458, 94 S.Ct. 690, 693 (1974) (stating that general
principles of statutory construction must yield to clear contrary evidence of legislative intent);
Neuberger v. Commissioner, 311 U.S. 83, 88, 61 S.Ct. 97, 101 (1940) (same); Rector of Holy
Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 460, 12 S.Ct. 511, 512 (1892). See also Watt v.
Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266, 101 S. Ct. 1673, 1677 (1981) (concluding that the plain meaning rule
does not prohibit resort to legislative history to determine legislative intent).
79. Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242, 2249 (1992). As the Court illustrated, §
522(d)(10)(E) only refers and applies to retirement plans which are not subject to the alienation
provisions of § 1056(d) of ERISA. As noted, the Supreme Court could name but three (church plans,
governmental employee plans, and individual retirement accounts-IRA's). See also supra note 60.
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section 522(b)(2)(A) can be gleaned from the words of the statute.80 Even if
limited by the PattersonCourt's requirement that a finding of ambiguity necessarily
precedes resort to legislative history, isn't the need for such guidance immediately
apparent? The statute refers to no general or specific federal law of exemption and
limits the extent of section 522(b)(2)(A) only by reference to section 522(d). This
limitation does not, on its face, resolve interpretative issues. For example, section
522(d)(10)(A) provides an exemption covering "the debtor's right to receive a
social security benefit," and subsection (d)(10)(B) exempts "the debtor's right to
receive a veteran's benefit." Does reference to social security and veteran's
benefits within section 522(d) exclude these benefits from exempt status under
section 522(b)(2)(A) for debtors filing in "opt out states"? The interpretative
problem arises from the language of the social security and veteran's benefits
statutes relating to the exempt status of benefits. Under 38 U.S.C. § 5301(a),
veteran's benefits are not assignable and payments are generally exempt from
seizure "either before or after receipt by the beneficiary." ' In addition, social
security benefits are not assignable, and benefits "paid or payable" are exempt from
2

seizure.1

While this writer should not use his own acuity level as a yardstick for
distinguishing between "plainly meant" and ambiguously worded statutes (there
would be precious little that is plain), legislative history of section 522(b)(2)(A)
seems clearly appropriate in search of the answers, for example, to the questions:
(i) whether reference to social security and veteran's benefits within section 522(d)

80. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) (1988). Recall: "any property that is exempt under Federal law,
other than subsection (d) of this section ....
"
81. 38 U.S.C. § 5301(a) (Supp. IV 1992) reads as follows:
Non-assignability and exempt status of benefits
(a) Payments of benefits due or to become due under any law administered by the
Secretary shall not be assignable except to the extent specifically authorized by law, and
such payments mad to, or on account of, a beneficiary shail be exempt from taxation,
shall be exempt from the claim of creditors, and shall not be liable to attachment, levy,
or seizure by or under any legal or equitable process whatever, either before or after
receipt by the beneficiary. The preceding sentence shall not apply to claims of the United
States arising under such laws nor shall the exemption therein contained as to taxation
extend to any property purchased in part or wholly out of such payments. The provisions
of this section shall not be construed to prohibit the assignment of insurance otherwise
authorized under chapter 19 of this title, or of servicemen's indemnity. For purposes of
this subsection, in any case where a payee of an educational assistance allowance has
designated the address of an attorney-in-fact as the payee's address for the purpose of
receiving a benefit check and has also executed a power of attorney giving the attorney-infact authority to negotiate such benefit check, such action shall be deemed to be an
assignment and is prohibited.
82. 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) (1988) reads as follows:
(a) The right of any person to any future payment under this subchapter shall not be
transferable or assignable, at law or in equity, and none of the moneys paid or payable
or rights existing under this subchapter shall be subject to execution, levy,, attachment,
garnishment, or other legal process, or to the operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency
law.
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excludes them from the coverage of section 522(b)(2)(A); (ii) whether the apparent
limitation within section 522(d) to "the debtor's right to receive" benefits excludes
past payments clearly contemplated by 38 U.S.C. § 5301(a) and 42 U.S.C. §407(a);
(iii) whether, if past payments are excluded from exemption under section 522(d),
this exclusion would bring at least past paid benefits under the effect of section
522(b)(2)(A); and (iv) whether the limitation in section 522(b)(2)(A) should be
narrowly construed so that only property which derives its federally operated
exemption status solely from section 522(d) is excepted from exemption under
section 522(b)(2)(A). 3
Reference to legislative history, as mentioned, reveals an illustrative list of
federal laws, the benefits pursuant to which are to be exempt (if section 522(b)(2)
is chosen or required by applicable state law). 4 Clearly, according to the
congressional reports, both social security and veteran's benefits, as well as, for
example, railroad and civil service employee retirement benefits are exempt. If
resort to legislative history is not objectionable, Congress' clear intention in
enacting section 522(b)(2)(A) was to include these benefits in the individual
debtor's bankruptcy estate, subject tQ the debtor's right to make a proper claim of
exemption. Analysis of a random sampling of the illustrative federal laws (social
security and veteran's, civil service, and railroad employee retirement benefits)
arguably places the PattersonCourt on shaky ground. All of the benefits referred
to are subject to anti-alienation provisions restricting voluntary and involuntary
alienation."5
Of the four examples mentioned, each style of benefit clearly is not only
exempt from execution process, seizure, etc. (involuntary transfers), but also (at

83. While these may be interesting (and hard) questions, answers to them are outside the scope
of this article. I try to establish their geneses in the language of the statute so that the legislative
history door can be opened. With respect to two of the questions (iii and iv), see Walker v.
Treadwell (In re Treadwell), 699 F.2d 1050 (11 th Cir. 1983) (holding that debtor who chooses §
522(d) exemption scheme may only claim an exemption covering the right to receive future
payments, while debtors who choose exemptions under § 522(b)(2)(A) may claim the exemption
afforded under 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) (1988) and exempt past payments as well as future benefits).
84. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
85. See supra notes 81-82 for text of the pertinent parts of the anti-assignment statutes relative
to veteran's and social security benefits. The railroad retirement anti-assignment statute is 45 U.S.C.
§ 231m (1988), which reads, in pertinent part:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b)of this section and the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954 [26 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.], notwithstanding any other law of the United States, or of
any State, territory, or the District of Columbia, no annuity or supplemental annuity shall
be assignable or be subject to any tax or to garnishment, attachment, or other legal process
under any circumstances whatsoever, nor shall the payment thereof be anticipated.
(footnote omitted). The anti-assignment statute relative to civil service retirement benefits is 5 U.S.C.
§ 8346 (1988), which reads, in pertinent part:
(a) The money mentioned by this subchapter is not assignable, either in law or equity,
except under the provisions of subsections (h) and (j) of section 8345 of this title, or
subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process, except as
otherwise may be provided by Federal laws.
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least with respect to the debtor's present interest in future benefits) is subject to
restriction on voluntary assignment or transfer. Therefore, an individual debtor's
interest in retirement benefits established by these federal laws is subject to
restrictions on transfer, which are identical in nature to the restriction on transfer
imposed upon ERISA plans subject to the provisions of section 1056(d).
In response, it could be argued that the distinction between an interest in an
ERISA plan and an interest in retirement benefits under any of the four examples
is that the debtor's interest in the ERISA plan is a beneficial interest in a trust,
which makes section 541(c)(2) directly applicable, while a right to receive the other
federal retirement benefits is not. 86 However, this argument does not hold. For
example, 42 U.S.C. §401(a) and (b) establish two trusts, the "Federal Old Age and
Survivors Insurance Trust Fund" and the "Federal Disability Insurance Trust
Fund." Payments of benefits due under the social security laws are payable from
these "trusts."87 The statutes establishing railroad employee retirement benefits
provide for the continuation of "The Railroad Retirement Account" to be
maintained by appropriations and tax collections for the purpose of funding benefits
due.88

86. The Patterson Court equates the debtor's interest in an ERISA qualified plan with having
a beneficial interest in a trust (and, in fact, uses "plan" and "trust" interchangeably). Patterson v.
Shumate, 112 S.Ct. 2242, 2247-48 (1992).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 401(h) (1988), which reads as follows:
(h) Benefit payments
Benefit payments required to be made under section 423 of this title, and benefit
payments required to be made under subsection (b), (c), or (d) of section 402 of this title
to individuals entitled to benefits on the basis of the wages and self-employment income
of an individual entitled to disability insurance benefits, shall be made only from the
Federal Disability Insurance Trust Fund. All other benefit payments required to be made
under this subchapter (other than section 426 of this title) shall be made only from the
Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund.
88. 45 U.S.C. § 231n(a) (1988), which reads as follows:
(a) Maintenance of account; authorization of appropriations
The Railroad Retirement Account established by section 15(a) of the Railroad
Retirement Act of 1937 [45 U.S.C. § 228o(a)] shall continue to be maintained in the
Treasury of the United States. There is hereby appropriated to such Account for each
fiscal year, beginning with the fiscal year ending June 30, 1975, to provide for the
payment of benefits to be made from such Account in accordance with the provisions of
section 231f(c)(1) of this title, and to provide for expenses necessary for the Board in the
administration of all provisions of this subchapter, an amount equal to amounts covered
into the Treasury (minus refunds) during each fiscal year under the Railroad Retirement
Tax Act [26 U.S.C. § 3201 et seq.], except those portions of the amounts covered into the
Treasury under sections 3211(b), 3221(c), and 3221(d) of such Tax Act [26 U.S.C. §§
3211(b), 3221(c), 3221(d)] as are necessary to provide sufficient funds to meet the
obligation to pay supplemental annuities at the level provided under section 231b(e) of
this title and, with respect to those entitled to supplemental annuities under section 205(a)
of title II of this Act, at the level provided under section 205(a).
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Similarly, Congress has created a separate "Civil Service and Disability Fund"
for the purpose of paying benefits due retirees. 89 (There is no separately created
fund established for the purpose of payment of veterans' benefits.)
While among the aforementioned examples, the social security statutes make
the sole reference to benefits being paid from a "trust," the establishment of a fund
administered by the agency purely for the benefit of retiree/beneficiaries represents,
from a statutory standpoint, no perceptible practical difference. Therefore,
according to the legislative history, at least three of the examples of federal law
exemptions bear the operative hallmarks of the ERISA "trust," including the
restrictions on alienation.'

89. 5 U.S.C. § 8348(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), which reads, in pertinent part:
(a) There is a Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund. The Fund(1) is appropriated for the payment of(A) benefits as provided by this subchapter or by the provisions of chapter 84 of
this title which relate to benefits payable out of the Fund; and
(B) administrative expenses incurred by the Office of Personnel Management in
placing in effect each annuity adjustment granted under section 8340 or 8462 of this
title, in administering survivor annuities and elections providing therefor under
sections 8339 and 8341 of this title, or subchapters I1 and IV of chapter 84 of this
title, in administering alternative forms of annuities under sections 8343a and 8420a
(and related provisions of law), and in withholding taxes pursuant to section 3405 of
title 26; and
(2) is made available, subject to such annual limitation as the Congress may
prescribe, for any expenses incurred by the Office in connection with the administration of this chapter, chapter 84 of this title, and other retirement and annuity statutes.
90. In fact, notwithstanding the reliance of the Patterson Court upon prior case law interpreting
ERISA as containing an actual restriction on assignment or transfer (voluntary or involuntary), see
Patterson, 112 S. Ct. at 2250, the statutory examples do in fact contain more concrete anti-alienation
language than does ERISA (29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)). Recall that in Goff, the court noted the distinction
between the ERISA requirement that "each pension plan shall provide that benefits under the plan
may not be assigned or alienated" (29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1)) and the absolute prohibitions contained
within the illustrated statutes, and concluded that the ERISA requirement "merely provides that as
a condition of obtaining qualified status-with its attendant tax and other benefits-a pension plan
must preclude alienation or assignment of benefits." Goff v. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574, 585
(5th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court has taken an interesting approach to its conclusion that the ERISA provision
operates as a statutory bar to involuntary alienation. In Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv.,
Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 108 S. Ct. 2182 (1988), the Court faced the question of whether a particular state
statute prohibiting garnishment of welfare benefit plans was preempted by ERISA (and, if so, whether
the general garnishment statute of the state, which would allow garnishment of welfare benefits,
would also be preempted). Within the opinion, the Court, distinguishing welfare benefits from
pension benefits, remarked that "when Congress was adopting ERISA, it had before it a provision
to ban the alienation or garnishment of ERISA plan benefits, and chose to impose that limitation only
with respect to ERISA pension benefits plans, and not ERISA welfare benefit plans." Mackey, 486
U.S. at 837, 108 S. Ct. at 2189 (emphasis in original).
Subsequently, in Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 110 S. Ct. 680
(1990), the Court on its way to holding that,the anti-alienation provisions of § 1056(d) prohibit
imposition of a constructive trust upon the interest of a participant guilty of embezzlement from the
plan fund (in favor of those parties injured), noted the prior discussion in Mackey and reiterated that
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Though the Goff court does ultimately conclude that "[t]he only reasonable
inference to draw is that Congress intended that pensions provided for by federal
law can be insulated from bankruptcy only to the extent recognized in Section
522,' the analysis is backdoor. As shown above, the court distinguished the
ERISA anti-alienation provisions from those within the legislative illustration
underlying section 522(b)(2)(A), determined that interests in ERISA plans were not
exempt under section 522(b)(2)(A), and used this determination as the basis for its
conclusions that (i) because Congress made reference to "federal law" in section
522 and not in section 541(c)(2), section 541(c)(2) is limited to applicable state law;
and (to come full circle) (ii) because section 541(c)(2) is limited to state law,
Congress clearly intended to deal with federal retirement and pension benefits
under section 522 only. The Goffcourt has something of a cart/horse problem that
resort to legislative history in the manner and for the purpose proposed above
perhaps could have resolved.
Attempting to read sections 541 (c)(2) and 522(b)(2)(A) in parimateria
(without regard to whether ERISA-qualified pension plans can be exempt under
section 522(b)(2)(A)) arguably yields the conclusion that reading "applicable
nonbankruptcy law" expansively either renders section 522(b)(2)(A) meaningless
or results in a construction of that statute that contravenes the clear legislative intent
to deal with federally created trusts (or retirement plan accounts) through the
exemption statute (or both).92

§ 1056(d) "proscribes the assignment or alienation of pension plan benefits, but that no comparable
provision applies to ERISA welfare benefit plans." Id. at 371. 110 S. Ct. at 685.
Despite the plain wording of the statute, that the "plan shall provide that benefits .. may not be
assigned or alienated" (which plainly means only that the plan shallprovide), the Court, without a
statutory shoehorn, has bootstrapped ERISA into an absolute prohibition on assignment or alienation.
Without additional or supporting statutory language, it is difficult to construe the requirement that
the plan shall provide to mean "because the plan must provide that benefits ... may not be assigned
or alienated, this restriction shall be enforceable as against all transferees, and shall act to exempt
from execution, process, seizure, encumbrance a participant's interest in a plan qualified under this
subsection."
Therefore, in light of Mackey and Guidry, the ERISA restrictions on transfer are to be interpreted
as indistinguishable from those absolute statutory provisions in the statutory examples. However,
from the words themselves, it takes abig jump to get to Mackey and Guidry (and but a small tiptoe
to get to Goff).
91.
Goff, 706 F.2d at 586.
92. As mentioned above, the Goffs sought to exclude their plans from their estate, having
claimed exemptions under state law. The court in Goff makes clear that with respect to § 522(b)(a),
the Goffs "did not attempt to claim exemption of their ERISA-qualified Keogh plans under this other
'Federal law' exemption." Id. at 582 (footnote omitted). Clearly, the Goff court's view is that the
plan would not have beeni so exempt. While this writer's proposed analysis does not necessarily
undermine the court's conclusion that ERISA-qualified plans are not exempt under § 522(b)(2)(A),
at least the portion of the opinion seeking to distinguish between the absolute prohibition on
alienation contained in the statutes illustratively listed and the more limited provision in ERISA
probably does not hold water in light of Mackey and Guidry, both decided subsequently to Goff. For
cases dealing with this issue, see Reed v. Drummond (In re Reed), 951 F.2d 1046 (9th Cir. 1991)
(holding that Congress did not intend to allow ERISA exemption), superseded on other grounds, 985
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The PattersonCourt's conclusion that its interpretation of section 541(c)(2)
does not render section 522(d)(10)(E) superfluous is also shaky because it fails to
consider the effect upon section 522(d)(10)(A) and (B). While perhaps section
522(d)(10)(E) does encompass a broader range of retirement plans than those
covered by the anti-alienation provisions of 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d), certainly the right
to receive social security and veteran's retirement benefits falls neatly within the
sphere of the anti-alienation provisions covering those specific types of benefits.
If the foregoing analysis is good for anything other than using paper, an argument
that the Court's holding does not render subsections (A) and (B) of section
522(d)(10) superfluous is hard to maintain.93
So, what of all of this? This writer, for what it is worth, has attempted to show
that the Supreme Court could have taken a different approach, one that would have
done less damage to the prospect of reading the statutes comprising the Bankruptcy
Code as an integrated whole. However, one must ultimately ask, "So what?"
(because the Court's holding is the Court's holding, and from a political perspective, there will be no groundswell to prod legislation that embraces this writer's
analysis)." Once this question is asked, it is time to move on.

F.2d 1026 (9th Cir. 1993); Pitrat v. Garlikov, 947 F.2d 419 (9th Cir. 1991) (same), superseded on
other grounds, 992 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1993); Daniel v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank (In re Daniel), 771
F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1985); Lichstrahl v. Bankers Trust (In re Lichstrahl), 750 F.2d 1488 (11th Cir.
1985); Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984); In re Fullmer, 127 B.R.
55 (D. Utah 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 977 F.2d 595 (10th Cir. 1992); In re Knowles 123 B.R.
428 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991); In re Rosenquist, 122 B.R. 775 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990); Nelson v.
Carver (In re Carver), 128 B.R. 239 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1990); In re Morrow, 122 B.R. 151 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1990); In re McIntosh, 116 B.R. 277 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1990); In re Gardner, 118 B.R.
860 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990); In re Brown, 95 B.R. 216 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1989); In re Alagna, 107
B.R. 301 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1989); In re Toner, 105 B.R. 978 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1989); In re Gribben,
84 B.R. 494 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988); Wear v. O'Brien (In re O'Brien), 94 B.R. 583 (Bankr. W.D.
Mo. 1988).
But see In re Shaker, 137 B.R. 930 (Bankr. W.D. Wisc. 1992) (concluding that the ERISA antialienation provision is a federal nonbankruptcy exemption under § 522(b)(2)(A)); In re Hennessey,
135 B.R. 711 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1992) (same); In re Sawyers, 135 B.R. 371 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1992);
In re Damast, 136 B.R. 11 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1991); In re Enfield, 133 B.R. 515 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1991); In re White, 131 B.R. 526 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991); In re Suarez, 127 B.R. 73 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 1991); In re Majul, 119 B.R. 118 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990); Richardson v. Daily (In re Starkey),
116 B.R. 259 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990); In re Messing, 114 B.R. 541 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1990), rev'd,
No. 90-00601 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 13, 1990), rev'd sub norn. Mostoller v. Messing (In re Messing), 944
F.2d 905 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1585 (1992) and 112 S. Ct. 2991 (1992); In re
Felts, 114 B.R. 131 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990); In re Bums, 108 B.R. 308 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1989);
In re Komet, 104 B.R. 799 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989); see also Checkett v. Vickers (In re Vickers),
954 F.2d 1426 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 4 (1992) (holding that preemption of a state
statute which furthers the purposes of ERISA would invalidate § 522, which allows states to opt out
and create their own exemptions); Heitkamp v. Dyke (In re Dyke), 943 F.2d 1435 (5th Cir. 1991)
(same).
93. See Walker v. Treadwell (In re Treadwell), 699 F.2d 1050 (lth Cir. 1983), referred to
supra at note 83. The court in that case had no difficulty handling the relationship between §
522(b)(2)(A) and § 522(d)(10)(A) from an exemption perspective.
94. In fact, quite the contrary. Pending legislation will, if passed, amend § 541(c) by adding
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E. Effect of Patterson on LouisianaExemption Law
Pattersondoes not address questions of exemption law, but one of the ripple
effects arguably has been to render certain portions of the Louisiana exemption law
unconstitutional.
As of the Goffopinion, Texas exemption law did not grant an exemption
covering ERISA-qualified plans.95 As a result of the Goff holding, the Texas
legislature amended the state exemption statute to provide a state law exemption for
pension plans qualified for favorable tax treatment under the Internal Revenue
Code." Louisiana law, as of 1952, has contained an exemption statute pertaining
to pensions.97 Louisiana Revised Statutes 20:33(1) was amended in 1983 to
provide as follows:
Pension,annuity, and gratuitypayment by employers
The following shall be exempt from all liability for any debt except
alimony and child support:
(1) All pensions, all proceeds of and payments under annuity policies
or plans, all individual retirement accounts, all Keogh plans, all simplified
employee pension plans, and all other plans qualified under Sections 401
or 408 of the Internal Revenue Code. However, an individual retirement
account, Keogh plan, simplified employee pension plan, or other qualified
plan is only exempt to the extent that contributions thereto were exempt
from federal income taxation at the time of contribution, plus interest or
dividends that have accrued thereon. No contribution shall be exempt if
made less that [sic] one calendar year from the date of filing for bankruptcy, whether voluntary or involuntary, or less than one calendar year from
the date writs of seizure are filed against such account or plan.98

a new subsection (§ 541(c)(3)), which in its present form reads:
(3) (A) Subject to subparagraph (B), assets and benefits accumulated for the benefits of
a debtor pursuant to a pension, profitsharing, stock bonus, or other plan qualified under
section 401(a), 403(a), 403(b), or 408(k), or a governmental plan under 414(d), or 457 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and any rights of debtor to such assets or benefits
shall be excluded for the property of the estate.
(B) Subparagraph (A) does not apply to plan assets or benefits attributable to contributions of the debtor to the extent that such contributions were in excess of the applicable
limits on such contributions under section 401(k), 401(m), or 415 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986.
S. Rep. No. 540, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., § 207 (1993).
95. Goff, 706 F.2d at 579.
96. Heitkamp v. Dyke (In re Dyke), 943 F.2d 1435, 1439 (5th Cir. 1991).
97. The legislature first enacted the provision as La. R.S. 20:33 (1952) (1952 La. Acts No. 117,
§ 1), which read in pertinent part as follows:
Pension, annuity, and gratuity payment by employers
[T]he following shall be exempt from all liability for any debt except alimony and child
support:
(1) All pensions and all proceeds of and payments under annuity policies or plans.
98. 1983 La. Acts No. 362, § I.
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Subsequently, the Louisiana legislature amended Louisiana Revised Statutes
13:3881 by adding subsection (D), which reads:
D. (1) The following shall be exempt from all liability for any debt
except alimony and child support: all pensions, all proceeds of and
payments under annuity policies or plans, all individual retirement
accounts, all Keogh plans, all simplified employee pension plans, and all
other plans qualified under Sections 401 and 408 of the Internal Revenue
Code. However, an individual retirement account, Keogh plan, simplified
employee pension plan, or other qualified plan is only exempt to the
extent that contributions thereto were exempt from federal income
taxation at the time of contribution, plus interest or dividends that have
accrued thereon.
(2) No contribution shall be exempt if made less than one
calendar from the date of filing for bankruptcy, whether voluntary or involuntary, or less than one calendar year from the date
writs of seizure are filed against such account or plan.99
Even if not so intended, the effect of the amendments to these exemption
statutes was to take Louisiana debtors out from under the purview of the Goff
holding by providing a state law exemption covering retirement plans qualified
under and regulated by ERISA. °°
The Louisiana exemption statute has decreed, pursuant to section 522(b)(2)(A)
of the Bankruptcy Code, that Louisiana citizens filing bankruptcy are limited to
claiming state law exemptions and those exemptions established by other federal
law, except under subsection (d) of section 522.1'0 Therefore, under Louisiana
state law, debtors are ostensibly protected from the discussion in Goff that excludes
ERISA from the list of other federal laws (those found in section 522(d)) providing
exemptions. So far, all appears well.
In bankruptcy law, however, appearances can be deceiving. Numerous state
legislatures apparently took the same approach to offering state law exemption2
protection to ERISA-qualified retirement plans as did Louisiana and Texas.°
Rather than solve the Goff problem, these state statutes created a concern doubtless
unforeseen, a problem that was foreshadowed by Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc. 103

99. 1990 La. Acts No. 495, § 1.
100. Louisiana Legislative history has not been researched to determine whether this effect was
an intended or incidental consequence of the amendments to the exemption statutes.
101. La. R.S. 13:3881(B)(1) (1982), which reads:
B. (1) In cases instituted under the provisions of Title 11 of the United States Code,
entitled "Bankruptcy," there shall be exempt from the property of the estate of an
individual debtor only that property and income which is exempt under the laws of the
state of Louisiana and under federal laws other than Subsection (d) of Section 522 of said
Title 11 of the United States Code.
102. See infra note 112 and cases cited therein.
103. 463 U.S. 85, 103 S. Ct. 2890 (1983).
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and came to fruition as a result of the Supreme Court case Mackey v. Lanier
Collection Agency Service, Inc.'°4
In Mackey, the Court was faced with the question of whether a Georgia statute
was unconstitutional because it was preempted by ERISA. 0 5 The statute
excluded funds and payments from employee welfare plans subject to the
provisions of ERISA from garnishment process, except to collect child support or
alimony.
ERISA contains a preemption section, which states:
(a) Supersedure;effective date
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of
this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and
all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee
benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under
section 1003(b) of this title. This section shall take effect on January 1,
1975.'06
Interpreting section 1144(a) and citing Shaw v. DeltaAirlines, Inc.,'0 7 the
court reiterated that "a law 'relates to' an employee benefit plan, in the normal
sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such plan,"' 08 and
that "we have virtually taken it for granted that state laws which are 'specifically
designed to effect employee benefit plans' are preempted under §541(a) [29 USC
§ I 144(a)]."'09 It is of no moment, says the Court, that the state law "was enacted
by the Georgia legislature to help effectuate ERISA's underlying purposes" for
ERISA "'displaces all state laws that fall within its sphere, even including state
laws that are consistent with ERISA's substantive requirements..'"0
Because the Georgia statute "singles out ERISA employee welfare benefit
plans for different treatment under state garnishment procedures," and because the
"statute's express reference to ERISA plans suffices to bring it within the federal
law's preemptive reach," the Court struck down the statute as preempted by ERISA
and of no force and effect."'
After Goff,an immense body of case law developed that followed the holding
that ERISA-qualified plans became property of the bankruptcy estate and were not

104. 486 U.S. 825, 108 S.Ct. 2182 (1988).
105. Id. at 827, 108 S.Ct. at 2185.
106. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988).
107. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97, 103 S.Ct. at 2900.
108. Mackey, 486 U.S. at 829, 108 S.Ct. at 2185 (emphasis in original).
109. Id. (citation omitted).
110. Id. (citation omitted).
111. Id. at 830, 108 S.Ct. at 2185. The Court went on to uphold the general garnishment statute
which, by general effect, would allow garnishment of welfare benefit plans as not being sufficiently
related to ERISA and not contravening the anti-alienation provisions of § 1056(d). Id. at 841, 108
S.Ct. at 2191. (Recall that welfare benefit plans are not subject to the anti-alienation provision of
§ 1056(d). See supra note 90).
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exempt under federal law exemptions under section 522(b)(2)(A). In addition,
these cases went even further. Using Shaw and Mackey as authority, this body of
jurisprudence held (in cases where debtors were required by state law to claim state
law exemptions or choose state law exemptions instead of those afforded under
section 522(d)) that state laws that purported to2 exempt plans subject to the
provisions of ERISA were preempted by ERISA.1
The effect of these case holdings was that debtors in such situations found that
their retirement plans were property of their bankruptcy estates, but because of the
combination of the Goff holding (no exemption under "other federal laws") and
preemption of the state law exemption statutes, they were entitled to no exemption
covering ERISA-qualified plans. Therefore, though the retirement plans (as long
as subject to 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)) could not be seized outside of bankruptcy, once
inside the "protection" of the Bankruptcy Code, these same plans were defenseless
against bankruptcy trustees seeking to liquidate the plans for the benefit of
creditors." 3

112. See, e.g., Pitrat v. Garlikov, 947 F.2d 419, 429 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding the Arizona
exemption statute preempted by ERISA); Gaines v. Nelson (In re Gaines), 121 B.R. 1015, 1022-23
(W.D. Mo. 1990) (holding that ERISA preempts state-created exemptions established pursuant to §
522(b)(2)(A)); In re Vanmeter, 137 B.R. 908, 916 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1992) (same); In re Hennessey,
135 B.R. 711, 714 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1992); In re McIntosh, 116 B.R. 277, 280 (Bankr. N.D. OkI.
1990); In re Starkey, 116 B.R. 259, 263 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990); In re Martin, 115 B.R. 311, 322-23
(Bankr. D. Utah 1990), aff'd sub nom. In re Fullmer, 127 B.R. 55, 59 (D. Utah 1991) rev'don other
grounds; sub non. Fullmer v. Rupp (In re Fullmer), 977 F.2d 595 (10th Cir. 1992); In re Messing,
114 B.R. 541, 544-45 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, No. 90-00601 (E.D. Tenn.
Dec. 13, 1990), rev'd on other grounds, sub. nom. Mostoller v. Messing (In re Messing), 944 F.2d
905 (6th Cir. 1991) cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 1585 (1992) and 112 S. Ct. 2991 (1992); In re Conroy,
110 B.R. 492, 496-97 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1990); In re Alagna, 107 B.R. 301 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1989);
In re Sellers, 107 B.R. 152 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1989); In re Sheppard, 106 B.R. 724 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1989); In re Weeks, 106 B.R. 257 (Bankr. E.D. Okla.. 1989); Fogler v. Flindall (In re Flindall),
105 B.R. 32, 37-40 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1989); In re Komet, 104 B.R. 799, 801-04 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
1989); In re Brown, 95 B.R. 216 (Bankr. N.D. Oki. 1989); Penick v. Hirsch (In re Hirsch), 98 B.R.
1 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1988), aff'd sub norn. In re Siegel, 105 B.R. 556 (D. Ariz. 1989).
But see In re Vickers, 954 F.2d 1426, 1428 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding that ERISA does not preempt
state exemptions statute because the statute was consistent with ERISA's substantive provisions and
preemption would impermissibly modify or impair exemption scheme contemplated by §
522(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code); In re Volpe, 943 F.2d 1451, 1452-53 (5th Cir. 1991) (same);
Heitkamp v. Dyke (In re Dyke), 943 F.2d 1435, 1450 (5th Cir. 1991); In re Shaker, 137 B.R. 930,
942 (Bankr. W.D. Wisc. 1992); In re Suarez, 127 B.R. 73 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1991); In re Hentzen,
126 B.R. 600 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1991); In re James, 126 B.R. 360 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1991); In re
Williams, 118 B.R. 812 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1990); In re Nuttleman, 117 B.R. 975, 982 (Bankr. D.
Neb. 1990), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Nuttleman v. Myers, 128 B.R. 254 (D. Neb. 1991);
In re Seilkop, 107 B.R. 776 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989); In re Martinez, 107 B.R. 378 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1989); In re Bryan, 106 B.R. 749 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989); see also Pitrat v. Garlikov, 947 F.2d 419,
432 (9th Cir. 1991) (Sneed, J., dissenting).
113. To many, it must be supposed, this result seemed quite a perverse consequence of
"protective" state legislation. Those persons rendered ,anxious by such cases were not limited to
debtors. Bankruptcy trustees who had administered hundreds or even thousands of cases without
attempting to liquidate retirement plans, because of state law exemption statutes, were (or should have
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For debtors in the Fifth Circuit, help was on the way. The court, in In re
Dyke," 4 faced and reaffirmed its holding in Goff, but went on to explore the
preemption issue in connection with the Texas exemption statute."1 5 Focusing
upon the savings clause found in 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d)," 6 the court concluded that
because ERISA cannot be construed "to modify or impair the policies of other
federal laws," and that because the Bankruptcy Code has vested in these states the
authority to promulgate "a state exemption scheme that would advance the principal
goal of the Bankruptcy Code.... ERISA section 514(d) [29 USC § 1144(d)] saves
the Texas state exemption scheme from preemption."'' 7 In other words, by
providing that states can fashion exemption statutes applicable to citizens in
bankruptcy cases within the states, the Bankruptcy Code federalizes such state
exemption schemes.
Finding that the Texas exemption statute, which provided as a limitation only
that the contributions and the plan be qualified for favorable treatment under the
Internal Revenue Code,' 8 did not conflict with the objectives of the Bankruptcy
Code, the court held that the statute was therefore enforceable against a bankruptcy
trustee."19
What of Louisiana debtors? This writer has located no decisions on the
preemption question prior to Dyke. 20
Even after Dyke, however, a question remained for Louisiana debtors. Unlike
the Texas exemption statute, the Louisiana exemption statutes purport to allow
seizure of a portion of a debtor's interest in an ERISA plan. Generally, this portion
consists of all contributions not exempt from federal income taxation and all
contributions made within one year before bankruptcy or nonbankruptcy
seizure.' Conceivably, under the authority of Dyke, this limitation could have
been enforced. The trustee's argument would focus on the thrust of Dyke, that the
state exemption statute not be inconsistent with the objectives of the Bankruptcy
Code.' 22 Because section 522(d)(10)(E) provides an exemption of retirement
plans "to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any
dependent of the debtor," unless the plan was established by an insider of the
debtor, is based upon length of service, or is not qualified for favorable tax

been) quite anxious themselves.
114. 943 F.2d 1435 (5th Cir. 1991).
115. Id. at 1447-50.
116. For text of 29 U.S.C. § 1444(d) (1988), see supra note 37.
117. In re Dyke, 943 F.2d at 1450.
118. Id. at 1439-40.
119. Id. at 1450.
120. Beginning in about 1990, trustees in the Middle District of Louisiana filed a blanket of
objections to claims of exemptions which covered the entire range of cases involving retirement
plans. Many objections were settled before hearing. By the time a matter worth fighting over came
up for hearing, In re Dyke was on appeal. This writer, risking the perception of cowardice, waited
it out.
121. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
122. In re Dyke, 943 F.2d 1435, 1450 (5th Cir. 1991).
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treatment under sections of the Internal Revenue Code, 123 the trustee would
attempt to convince the court that deducting only one year's worth of contributions
and those not qualified for favorable tax treatment would not conflict with the
"reasonably necessary" limitation imposed by the Bankruptcy Code itself. Also,
the limitation of the exemption "to the extent that contributions thereto were
exempt from federal income taxation at the time of contribution" found in both
applicable Louisiana exemption statutes would appear consistent with the limitation24
contained within section 522(d)(10)(E) and, therefore, enforceable under Dyke. '
What about these statutory limitations after Patterson?If a debtor's retirement
plan is subject to the anti-alienation provisions of 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d), Patterson
teaches that the plan is not property of the bankruptcy estate. Therefore, the issue
of exempt status is moot. If the plan is not property of the estate and, therefore, not
subject to the exemption provisions of section 522(b)(2)(A), can it be said that the
exemption statute, as it relates to ERISA qualified plans, is promulgated by
authority vested by the Bankruptcy Code? It is doubtful that any Bankruptcy Code
objective can be articulated to support the notion that the exemption provisions of
the Bankruptcy Code apply to federalize state law exemption statutes covering
property that is not property of the bankruptcy estate. (In fact, as shown throughout
this article, property that is not property of the bankruptcy estate is not subject to
a claim of exemption within the bankruptcy case.)
If the state law exemption statutes covering ERISA-qualified plans cannot be
seen to have a federal genesis, then it seems to follow that 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) 25
is not applicable, and the exemption statute is to be scrutinized from
the perspective
26
of the preemption provision of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).1
Analysis of the Louisiana legislation under the guidance of Mackey generates
the conclusion that at least a great portion of Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:3881(d)
and 20:33(1) are preempted by ERISA. Both statutes specifically refer to
retirement plans regulated by ERISA. Indeed, though it could be argued that a state
statute granting an exemption fully corresponds with the substantive requirements
of ERISA, particularly section 1056(d), such coalescence of objectives does not
spare a statute from preemption. 2 Further, the Louisiana statutes are not even
consistent on all fours with the substantive provisions of ERISA. The antialienation section, 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d), has been conclusively determined to
constitute an absolute bar to seizure. 8 Therefore, the Louisiana statutory
limitation of the extent of the exemption, which specifically allows seizure (by a
bankruptcy trustee or creditor outside of bankruptcy) of one year's worth of

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
(1988).
128.

1t U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) (1988).
See La. R.S. 20:33(1) (1983) and La. R.S. 13:3881(D) (1990).
See supra note 37 for full text.
See supra note 36 for full text.
Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 829. 108 S. Ct. 2182, 2185
See supra note 90.
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contributions and any contributions which are not exempt from taxation, clearly
contravenes the ERISA bar against alienation of interests in qualified plans. 129
It appears, therefore, that at least to the extent Louisiana Revised Statutes
13:3881 (D) and 20:33(1) apply to a debtor's interest in an ERISA-qualified plan
subject to the anti-alienation requirements imposed by 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d), the
statutes are preempted by ERISA and, therefore, are unconstitutional. Thus,
caution is warranted before relying upon the provisions of Louisiana Revised
Statutes 20:33(1) and 13:3881(D) as authority for the proposition that a portion of
a judgment debtor's retirement plan is subject to seizure (for example, by writ of
fierifacias)'a
II. AVOIDING POWERS: EXPANDED PREFERENCE PERIOD AGAINST NONINSIDERS

Generally, the bankruptcy trustee (or debtor-in-possession) 3' has the power
to avoid pre-petition preferential transfers.' 32 The trustee's avoiding power is
designed to accomplish an equitable distribution of estate property to creditors and
to prevent the debtor from choosing which creditors to repay.'33
Section 547(b)
of the Bankruptcy Code sets forth the elements of an avoidable
34
preference:

129. There is no requirement within ERISA that contributions to a plan be exempt from federai
taxation to be subject to the prohibition on alienation under § 1056(d).
130. See La. Code Civ. P. arts. 2291-2299. See particularly Article 2298, which provides
injunctive relief and a claim for damages, if "(1) ... the sheriff is proceeding with the execution
contrary to law."
131. Section 1107(a) of the Bankruptcy Code places a debtor-in-possession in the shoes of a
trustee. The debtor-in-possession has all of the rights, powers, and duties of a trustee, except the
right to compensation and the duty to investigate the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (1988).
132. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1988).
133. H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 177-78 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, 6138. See Danning v. Bozek (In re Bullion Reserve of N. Am.), 836 F.2d 1214, 1217 (9th Cir.
1988) ("The dual purpose of § 547 ... is to discourage creditors from racing to the courthouse to
dismember the debtor during its slide into bankruptcy and to further the prime bankruptcy policy of
equal distribution among similarly situated creditors."), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1056, 108 S. Ct. 2824
(1988); Coral Petroleum, Inc. v. Banque Paribas-London, 797 F.2d 1351, 1355 (5th Cir. 1986);
Grover v. Gulino (In re Gulino), 779 F.2d 546, 548-49 (9th Cir. 1985); Ray v. Security Mut. Fin.
Corp. (In re Arnett), 731 F.2d 358, 363 (6th Cir. 1984); Valley Bank v. Vance (In re Vance), 721
F.2d 259, 260 (9th Cir. 1983); Yellowhouse Mach. Co. v. Mack (In re Hughes), 704 F.2d 820, 822
(5th Cir. 1983); Barash v. Public Fin. Corp., 658 F.2d 504, 508 (7th Cir. 1981). See also Vern
Countryman, The Concept of a Voidable Preference in Bankruptcy, 38 Vand. L. Rev. 713, 748 (1985)
("Statements in the legislative history also mention preserving the bankruptcy policy of 'equality' of
distribution. But, with creditors classified for distribution purposes on the basis of liens and
priorities, no bankruptcy policy of 'equality' exists. A policy of preserving classes and of preserving_
equality within classes does exist, however, and the preference concept is designed to preserve this
policy.") (footnotes omitted).
134. Each of the elements listed in § 547(b) must exist before the trustee can avoid a transfer
as preferential. in re Bullion Reserve of N. Am., 836 F.2d at 1217 ("The burden of proving the
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(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the trustee
may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the
debtor before such transfer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the
filing of the petition; or
(B) between ninety days and one year before the
date of the filing of the petition, if such creditor at the
time of such transfer was an insider; and
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such
creditor would receive if(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this
title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to
35
the extent provided by the provisions of this title.'
Therefore, the preference (or reachback) period applicable to transfers to or for
the benefit of non-insider creditors is ninety days, while the period extends to a year
before bankruptcy for insiders. 3 6 Though the Code as originally enacted

existence of these elements is on the bankruptcy trustee,") (citing In re Gulino, 779 F.2d at 549, cert.
denied, 486 U.S. 1056, 108 S. Ct. 2824 (1988)); Waldschmidt v. Ranier (In re Fulghum Constr.
Corp.), 706 F.2d 171, 172 (6th Cir.), cert. denied sub nor. Ranier & Assocs. v. Waldschmidt, 464
U.S. 935, 104 S. Ct. 342 (1983); Barash, 658 F.2d at 507. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(g) (1988) ("For the
purposes of this section, the trustee has the burden of proving the avoidability of a transfer under
subsection (b) of this section ....").
135. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988).
136. Section 101(31) defines an insider as:
(A) if the debtor is an individual(i) relative of the debtor or of a general partner of the debtor;
(ii) partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(iii) general partner of the debtor; or
(iv) corporation of which the debtor is a director, officer, or person in control;
(B) if the debtor is a corporation(i) director of the debtor;
(ii) officer of the debtor;
(iii) person in control of the debtor;
(iv) partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(v) general partner of the debtor; or
(vi) relative of a general partner, director, officer, or person in control of the debtor;
(C) if the debtor is a partnership-(i) general partner in the debtor;
(ii) relative of a general partner in, general partner of, or person in control of the
debtor;
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required, in connection with avoidance actions against insiders concerning transfers
made outside the ninety-day period, that the trustee prove that the debtor was
insolvent and that the insider knew or should have known of the debtor's
insolvency, 37 the statute now requires only that insolvency be established at the
time of the transfer (regardless of the applicable reachback period)) 3
Such neat encapsulization, however, does not comport with the realities of the
financial marketplace. Typically, loan transactions are structured so that the
creditor-debtor financial arrangement involves both a principal obligation (and

obligor) and an obligation to guarantee performance (payment) of the principal
obligation that runs from a third party (or parties) to the creditor. The guarantor is
commonly a person or entity who fits the definition of "insider."1 39 Under
general principles of subrogation, the guarantor who is called upon to pay the

principal obligation acquires the right to pursue the principal obligor to the extent
payment is made on account of the guaranty agreement. 4 It is also easy to see
(if it is assumed that the guaranty is of the entirety of the principal obligation) that

(iii) partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(iv) general partner of the debtor; or
(v) person in control of the debtor;
(D) if the debtor is a municipality, elected official of the debtor or relative of an elected
official of the debtor;
(E) affiliate, or insider of an affiliate as if such affiliate were the debtor; and
(F) managing agent of the debtor;
11 U.S.C. § 101(31) (Supp. IV 1992).
137. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as 11 U.S.C.).
138. Section 547, as enacted by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, superseded § 60a and b
of the former Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 11 U.S.C. § 96. For a transfer to be avoidable under § 547,
it must have been made while the debtor was insolvent. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(3) (1988). Section
547(f) specifically provides that for purposes of § 547, "the debtor is presumed to have been
insolvent on and during the 90 days immediately preceding the date of the filing of the petition."
11 U.S.C. § 547(t) (1988); see Sandoz v. Fred Wilson Drilling Co. (In re Emerald Oil Co.), 695 F.2d
833, 838 n.5 (5th Cir. 1983) ("The 1978 creation of the presumption of insolvency was a change in
the prior law designed to simplify the trustee's former burden of reconstructing the debtor's books
and records, even though it was unusual that a debtor was not insolvent for the 90 days before the
bankruptcy petition was filed.").
For a discussion of the provisions of former § 60a and the changes made under § 547, see Barkley
Clark, Preferences Under the Old and New Bankruptcy Acts, 12 UCC L.J. 154 (1979-80); Michael
Kaye, Preferences Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 54 Am. Bankr. L.J. 197 (1980); Charles J.
Young, Preferences Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 54 Am. Bankr. L.J. 221 (1980);
Vernon 0. Teofan & L.E. Creel, Il,The Trustee'sAvoiding Powers Under the Bankruptcy Act and
the New Code: A ComparativeAnalysis, 85 Com. L.J. 542 (1980); Elizabeth A. Orelup, Note,
Avoidance of PreferentialTransfers Under the BankruptcyReform Act of 1978, 65 Iowa L. Rev. 209
(1979).
139. Though perhaps there exists specific authority for these propositions, the primary source
utilized here is the author's personal experience as both lawyer and judge. Attempting to ground
these observations in concrete source authority would seemingly differ little from dredging up
authority for the law of gravity (objects that are dropped, fall to the earth).
140. See generally La. Civ. Code arts. 1825-1830.
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each payment by the principal obligor reduces the exposure of the guarantor under
the guaranty agreement.
Under the Bankruptcy Code, the guarantor, who holds at least a contingent
claim against the principal obligor (even without having made payments), is a
"creditor" or a holder of a "claim" against the principal obligor. 4' Therefore,
payment by the principal obligor to the creditor is to be seen as payment (of an
antecedent debt) to or for the benefit of the guarantor "creditor," to the extent the
payment reduces the guarantor's exposure to the non-insider creditor who received
the payment.
Another section of the Bankruptcy Code must be folded in. Section 550
establishes the trustee's rights and parties' liability in connection with avoidable
transfers and provides, with section 550(a)(1), that if a transfer is avoidable under
section 547, the trustee may recover (either the property transferred or its value)
of such transfer or the entity for whose benefit such
from "the initial transferee
142
transfer was made."'

141. Section 101(10) defines "creditor" as:
(A) entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order
for relief concerning the debtor;
(B) entity that has a claim against the estate of a kind specified in section 348(d), 502(0,
502(g), 502(h) or 502(i) of this title; or
(C) entity that has a community claim;
11 U.S.C. § 101(10) (Supp. IV 1992).
The legislative history of § 101(10) also supports the proposition that a guarantor is a "creditor":
A guarantor of or surety for a claim against the debtor will also be a creditor, because he
will hold a contingent claim against the debtor that will become fixed when he pays the
creditor whose claim he has guaranteed or insured.
H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 309-10 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 626667; see also S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5808.
Section 101(5) defines "claim" as:
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated,
unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable,
secured, or unsecured; or
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to
a right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is reduced to
judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or
unsecured;
11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (Supp. IV 1992).
142. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1) (1988). Section 550 reads, in pertinent part:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent that a transfer is avoided
under section 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, 553(b), or 724(a) of this title, the trustee may
recover, for the benefit of the estate, the property transferred, or, if the court so orders,
the value of such property, from(1) the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity for whose benefit such transfer
was made; or
(2) any immediate or mediate transferee of such initial transferee.
(b) The trustee may not recover under section (a)(2) of this section from-
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Therefore, notwithstanding the nifty truism that a ninety-day reachback period
applies to non-insiders, but a one-year period applies to insiders, the question
arises: If a transfer is avoidable as a preference because of the benefit in favor of
the insider guarantor, might not the non-insider who actually received the payment
be subject to a one-year reachback period under section 550(a)(1)?
What follows is a discussion of the jurisprudence which has developed in
response to this question, lawyers' responses to the problem, a pending legislative
response to the courts' emergent interpretation, and finally a projection of the
consequences facing lawyers (and clients) in the event of passage of legislation
designed to overrule what has become, in the last three to five years, the majority
view among the courts.
A. Expanding Preference PeriodAgainst Non-insider Creditors
The early jurisprudence analyzing the question of whether the non-insider
transferee is subject to the one-year reachback period constructed an analysis which
insulated the non-insider transferee from exposure. This analysis was grounded in
principles of equity and has come to be known as the "two-transfer theory." Under
this theory, the first transfer is represented by the direct payment from the debtor
to the non-insider creditor. The second transfer (a theoretical transfer), from the
debtor to the guarantor, is comprised of the benefit received by the insider/guarantor by virtue of the satisfaction or reduction of the guarantor's contingent
liability. Use of this second transfer isolates the second transfer as providing the
benefit to the insider, thereby limiting the scope of the benefit conveyed by the
payment to the non-insider; only the non-insider benefits from the first transfer.
Accordingly, under section 547(b)(4)(B), only the second transfer to the insider/guarantor falls within the extended preference period and therefore is avoidable
because only the second transfer was to or for the benefit of the insider creditor.
The first transfer, to and for the benefit of the non-insider creditor only, is not
43
avoidable, however, because the ninety-day preference period applies.'

(1) a transferee that takes for value, including satisfaction or securing of a present or
antecedent debt, in good faith, and without knowledge of the voidability of the transfer
avoided; or
(2) any immediate or mediate good faith transferee of such transferee.
11 U.S.C. § 550(a)-(b) (1988).
1
143. See Block v. Texas Commerce Bank Nat'l Ass'n (/n re Midwestern Cos.) 102 B.R. 169
(W.D. Mo. 1989) (distinguishing between insiders and non-insiders by specifying different preference
periods); Official Creditors' Comm. of Arundel Hous. Components, Inc. v.Georgia-Pacific Corp. (hi
re Arundel Hous. Components, Inc.), 126 B.R. 216 (Bankr. D. Md. 1991) (same); Ray v. City Bank
& Trust Co. (In re C-L Cartage Co.), 70 B.R. 928 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1987), affd, 113 B.R. 416
(E.D. Tenn. 1988), affd in part, rev'd in part, 899 F.2d 1490 (6th Cir. 1990); In re Aerco Metals,
Inc., 60 B.R. 77 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985); Goldberger v. Davis Jay Corregated Box Corp. (In re
Mercon Indus.. Inc.), 37 B.R. 549 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984); Schmitt v. Equibank (In re R.A. Beck
Builder, Inc.), 34 B.R. 888 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1983); Bakst v. Schilling (In re Cove Patio Corp.), 19
B.R. 843 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982); Backhus v. Central Trust Co., N.A. (In re Duccilli Formal Wear.
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During the "old days" one bankruptcy court opinion, Mixon v. Mid-Continent
Systems, Inc. (In re Big Three Transportation,Inc.),' 44 however, stood against the
majority view by imposing the one-year period against a non-insider creditor.'45
The opinion does not delve into the dual-transfer analysis, but assumes there is only
one transfer (by means of one payment). The transfer is made to the bank and for
the benefit of the insider, as a result of reduction in insider exposure to the
bank. 46 The court then looked to section 550, which states in part that recovery
can be had against the initial transferee of such transfer orthe entity for whose
benefit such transfer was made (i.e., the bank or the insider), and concluded that the
statute gives the trustee an alternative source of recovery, 47whether or not the
transfer to the non-insider, if looked at alone, is preferential.
Subsequently, there were several reported decisions aligning with In re Big
Three, including the district court opinion in Levit v. IngersollRand Financial
Corp. (In re V.N. Deprizio ConstructionCo.).

48

Appeal to the Seventh Circuit

49
yielded the first circuit court opinion to embrace the In re Big Three holding.
Although the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Deprizioexpanded upon the
rationale in In re Big Three, the court essentially relied on what it considered the
clear language of the Code. 50 The analysis of the court is as follows:

(1) Section 547 allows the recovery of avoidable transfers made to or for
the benefit of a creditor;' 5'
(2) A payment effects a single transfer,
though the single transfer can
52
have more than one beneficiary;
(3) If the transfer is avoidable under section 547, the trustee looks to
section 550 of the Code to determine from whom the transfer can be
recovered;'

Inc.), 8 B.C.D. 1180 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982); Seeley v. Church Bldgs. and Interiors, Inc. (In re
Church Bldgs. and Interiors, Inc.), 14 B.R. 128 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1981); 4 Collier on Bankruptcy,
supra note 20, 550.02. at 550-12 to 14. See alsoT.B. Westex Foods, Inc. v. Alaska Continental
Bank (In re T.B. Westex Foods, Inc.), 96 B.R. 77 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989) (denying expanded
preference period to allow trustee's recovery from non-insider creditor), affd, Bankr. No. 88-70059,
Adv. No. 88-7023, 1990 WL 359063 (W.D. Tex. May 22, 1990), rev'd, 950 F.2d 1187 (5th Cir.
1992); Levit v. Melrose Park Nat'l Bank (In re V.N. Deprizio Constr. Co.), 58 B.R. 478 (Bankr. N.D.
IlI. 1986) (same), rev'd sub noma.Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp. (In re V.N. Deprizio Constr.
Co.), 86 B.R. 545 (N.D. Ill. 1988), affd in part, rev'd in part, 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989).

144.
145.
146.
147.

41 B.R. 16 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1983).
Id.
at 19-20.
Id.
at 19.
Id.
at 20-21.

148. 86 B.R. 545 (N.D. Ill. 1988), rev'g 58 B.R. 478 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986).
149. Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp. (In re V.N. Deprizio Constr. Co.), 874 F.2d 1186 (7th
Cir. 1989).

150.
151.
152.

Id.
at 1196-97.
Id. at 1189.
Id.
at 1195-96.

153.

Id. at 1190, 1194.
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(4) While section 547 distinguishes insiders from non-insiders (providing
one-year
and 90-day preference periods, respectively), section 550 does
54
1

not;

(5) Because section 550 says that an avoidable transfer can be recovered
from either the initial transferee (in this case, the bank) or an entity other
than the initial transferee, if that entity derived a benefit, and is a creditor,
the trustee can recover from the bank;'
(6) The one-year preference period is applicable to the bank because
section 550 does not require that the preference actually be avoidable as
against the initial transferee, but only that it be avoidable as to one of the
entities from whom recovery is possible. Since the one-year preference
period applies to transfers that benefit the insider creditor, the bank, as
initial transferee (the one which received the money) is exposed to any
preference
action that could have been brought against the insider
56
creditor.1

As noted in Deprizio, the bankruptcy court (which had followed the twotransfer theory in denying recovery against the bank) relied a good deal on "equity"
in finding that the non-insider creditor was not subject to the one-year period.'57
In response, the Seventh Circuit stated:
[I]n what sense is it "inequitable" to recapture payments to creditors that
may have been favored only because payment reduced insiders' exposure
(recall that the insiders select which debts to pay first), then distribute
these monies according to statutory priorities and contractual
entitlements? In what sense is it "inequitable" to require outside lenders
to pursue the insider-guarantors
for any shortfall, when they bargained for
58

exactly that recourse?1

ly.

Deprizio has been embraced by the majority of courts opining subsequentBecause of its pervasive effect, and because of the consequences of the

59

154.

Id. at 1194.

155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1198 (citing Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp. (In re V.N. Deprizio Constr. Co.), 86
B.R. 545, 552-53 (N.D. 111.
1988)).
158. Id.
159. See, e.g., Manufacturers Hanover Leasing Corp. v. Lowrey (In re Robinson Bros. Drilling,
Inc.), 892 F.2d 850 (10th Cir. 1989) (adopting the district court opinion at 97 B.R. 77 (W.D. Oki.
1988), which followed the reasoning of Deprizio, 86 B.R. 545 (N.D. Il. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989), and In re Big Three Transp., Inc., 41 B.R. 16 (Bankr. N.D.
111.1986)); Harrison v. Brent Towing Co. (In re H & S Transp. Co.), 110 B.R. 827 (M.D. Tenn.
1990) (following the reasoning of Deprizio in rejecting the "two transfer" theory), affd, 939 F.2d 355

(6th Cir. 1991); Cambridge Meridian Group, Inc. v. Conn. Nat'l Bank (In re Erin Food Servs., Inc.),
117 B.R. 21, 29 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990) (adopting the Deprizio opinion in holding that the one-year

insider preference period applies to payments made to acreditor which benefit the inside guarantor);
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court's analysis (some that the court itself refused to anticipate), a bit more
reflection on the opinion is warranted.
Remember that section 547 requires that the transfer be to or for the benefit of
a creditor. Deprizio also involved a preference action against the IRS seeking to
recover payments made during the year before bankruptcy on account of
withholding tax liability.' 6 The officers of the debtor corporation were potentially liable for an assessment of the tax liability (the dreaded 100% penalty) as
responsible parties'61 Therefore, the trustee argued that payments to the IRS
reduced the insiders' exposure and thus these payments were recoverable from the
IRS under the theory asserted against the bank.1 62 The court found that the
requirement of section 547(b)(1), that the transfers be "to or for the benefit of a
creditor," was not met in connection with the officers since there was no right of
subrogation or contribution over and against the corporation if the individuals had
to pay the tax penalty.1 63 The court held, therefore, that there was no prefer164
ence.
In arguing their positions, the secured creditors in Deprizio created numerous
hypothetical nightmares, hoping to sway the court with "policy." The court's
treatment of one of these hypothetical situations in dicta may very well not hold the
water that the court believed it carried and may reveal that the court failed to
comprehend the logical extension of its holding. One of the hypothetical horrors
urged upon the court by the creditor defendants was:
Lender #1 extends credit and takes security. It is so oversecured that
Lender #2 is willing to make a second loan and take a junior security
interest. This second loan (but not the first) is backed up by an insider's
guarantee. Every payment to Lender #1 increases the amount of security

Billings v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, N.A. (In re Granada, Inc.), 110 B.R. 548, 549-52 (Bankr. D. Utah
1990) (following the holdings of Deprizio and Robinson Bros.); In re Installation Servs., Inc., 101
B.R. 282, 284 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1989) (adopting the rational of Deprizio); Coastal Petroleum Corp.
v. Union Bank & Trust Co. (In re Coastal Petroleum Corp.), 91 B.R. 35, 37-38 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1988) (same). But see Rubin Bros. Footwear, Inc. v. Chemical Bank (In re Rubin Bros. Footwear,
Inc.), 119 B.R. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (declining to apply the Deprizio ruling); Block v. Texas
Commerce Bank Nat'l Ass'n (In re Midwestern Cos.), 102 B.R. 169 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (rejecting the
expanded preference period theory adopted by the court in Deprizio and requiring that the transfer
be preferential with respect to the initial transferee before § 550 allows recovery therefrom).
160. Deprizio, 874 F.2d at 1191-92.
161. Id. See Emshwiller v. United States, 565 F.2d 1042, 1047 (8th Cir. 1977); Monday v.
United States, 421 F.2d 1210, 1218 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 821, 91 S. Ct. 38 (1970),
remand, 342 F. Supp. 1271 (E.D. Wis. 1972), affd, 478 F.2d 1404 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
910, 94 S. Ct. 233 (1973); In re FJS Tools & Mfg. Co., 88 B.R. 866, 870 (Bankr. N.D. II1. 1988);
Arrigoni v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 792, 800-801 (1980); Policy Statement P-5-60, 1 Internal Revenue
Manual (CCH) 1305-14.
162. Deprizio, 874 F.2d at 1191.
163. Id. at 1191-92.
164. Id. at 1192.
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available for Lender #2,
which produces a benefit to Guarantor by
6
reducing his exposure.

The court opined that the transfers to Lender #1, though bestowing a benefit
upon the guarantor, are not preferential on two grounds. First, the court stated that
if payments were made according to the debt instruments, the defense assertable
under section 547(c)(2), that the payments were made in the ordinary course of
business, etc., would preclude recovery.'6
The court went on to say that even if the ordinary course of business defense
is not assumable:
By assumption Lender #1 is over-secured, so itsposition hasnot been
improved relativeto a Chapter7 liquidation,§ 547(b)(5). The benefit in

165. Id. at 1200.
166. Id. Section 547(c)(2) reads as follows:
(c) The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer(2) to the extent that such transfer was(A) in payment of a debt incurred by the debtor in the ordinary course of business
or financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee;
(B) made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and
the transferee; and
(C) made according to ordinary business terms; ....
11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2) (1988). As of the issuance of the court's decision in Deprizio, this assertion
was problematic given a number of decisions which excluded payments on account of long term debt
from the § 547(c)(2) defense. See CHG Int'l, Inc. v. Barclays Bank (In re CHG Int'l, Inc.), 897 F.2d
1479, 1485-86 (9th Cir. 1990) (concluding that the "ordinary course of business" exception in §
547(c)(2) does not include payments on long-term loans); WJM, Inc. v. Mass. Dep't of Public
Welfare, 840 F.2d 996, 1011 (1st Cir. 1988) (same); Marathon Oil Co. v. Flatau (In re Craig Oil
Co.), 785 F.2d 1563, 1567 (11 th Cir. 1986) (stating that "the scope of [§ 547(c)(2)'s] protection is
necessarily limited to trade credit which is 'kept current' or other transactions which are paid in full
within the initial billing cycle"); Covey v. Pottery Workers Credit Union (In re Rogers), 127 B.R.
844, 846 (C.D. III. 1989); Lingley v. Stuart Shaines, Inc. (In re Acme-Dunham, Inc.), 50 B.R. 734,
741 (D. Me. 1985); Gray v. A.I. Credit Corp. (In re Paris Indus., Corp.), 130 B.R. 1, 5 (Bankr. D.
Maine 1991); Ragsdale v. Citizens and S. Nat'l Bank (In re Control Elec., Inc.), 91 B.R. 1010, 1017
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988); McCullough v. Garland (In re Jackson), 90 B.R. 793, 796-97 (Bankr. D.S.C.
1988); McClanahan v. Lakeside Nat'l Bank (In re RDC Corp.), 88 B.R. 97, 100 (Bankr. W.D. La.
1988) (holding that payments on 90-day working capital loans, whose maturity had been extended
several months, were not transactions within the ordinary course of business exception); Aguillard
v. Bank of Lafayette (In re Bourgeois), 58 B.R. 657, 660 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1986) (opining that "[to
hold such payments on long term loans to be in the ordinary course of business within the meaning
of section 547(c)(2) would be to flout the clear intent of that subsection, and the entire policy of the
preference section as a whole.").
Reversing the Ninth Circuit court's decision in In re CHG Int'l, Inc., 897 F.2d 1479 (9th Cir.
1990), which followed Bourgeois, et al., the Supreme Court, in Union Bank v. Wolas, 112 S. Ct. 527
(1991), held that because the plain meaning of § 547(c)(2) yields the conclusion that there is no
limitation on the applicability of the ordinary course of business defense grounded in the nature of
the indebtedness, the defense is clearly applicable to preferential transfer actions attacking payments
on long-term debt. Wolas, 112 S. Ct. at 533.
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such a case is negligible at best, so the case for recapture is weak.
Because neither the bankruptcy court nor the district court considered this
in detail, we do not resolve it, but the Trustee has an uphill
question
67
battle. 1
The court's espousal on this second score is at best problematic. The rationale
underlying its decision to expand the preference period to allow recovery from noninsiders focuses on the benefit derived by the guarantor/insider,not the initial
transferee.1 68 Remember, the payments to the bank that were deemed recoverable
were not preferences vis-a-vis the bank, but were recoverable from the bank, as the
initial transferee, because they were preferences to the guarantor.' 69 The question
of whether the requirements of section 547(b)(5) have been met (that the transferee
receive more than it would have if the transfer had not been made and the estate
with the benefit derived by
was liquidated under Chapter 7) is asked in connection
70
the guarantor, not the payment to the bank.'
Analysis by mathematical example reveals the problem and, according to the
actual analysis of Deprizio, shows that the court's holding clearly stands for the
proposition that an oversecured lender without a guarantor can be liable for return
of payments received (despite the court's protestation to the contrary):
Assume: Property worth $100,000 (non-income producing)
1st mortgage = $70,000 (no guarantor)
2nd mortgage = $50,000 ($50,000 guarantee by insider)
Other creditors = $50,000
Other assets = $30,000
Payment on 1st mortgage (from unencumbered assets) = $10,000
(reducing other assets to $20,000)
Before payment, guarantor exposure is $20,000 (the difference between the value
of the collateral and the second mortgage claim amount).
Assume bankruptcy within one year after payment.
Liquidationresult:
1st mortgage = $60,000-paid by property
2nd mortgage = $50,000-$40,000 paid by property
$10,000 paid by guarantor

167. Deprizio, 874 F.2d at 1200 (citing Bonded Fin. Servs., Inc. v. European Am. Bank, 838
F.2d 890, 895 (7th Cir. 1988)) (emphasis added).
168. id. at 1200-01.
169. Id.
170. Recall that in order for apreference to be avoidable, all elements of § 547(b) must be met.
11 U.S.C. § 547(0 (1988). Therefore, if the payments to the bank are analyzed under § 547(b)
separate from any benefit derived by the guarantor, the payments between 90 days and one year
before bankruptcy are not preferential-the bank is not an irqsider. Clearly, then, the question is not
whether the fully secured bank received a benefit greater than it would have received in Chapter 7,
but whether the guarantor did.
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Claims against estate = $60,000 ($50,000-other creditors +
$10,000 guarantor claim)
Payment to creditors of = $20,000 = 33.33%
bankruptcy estate
$60,000
Question: What did guarantor really get?
Answer: Guarantor received 66.66% of claim, $10,000 (or 50%) as a
result of the payment to the first mortgage holder (through reduction of
exposure) and $3,333 (or 16.66% of the original $20,000 exposure) as a
result of liquidation of other assets.
Question: Did guarantor receive more than it would have if payment were
not made and estate liquidated under Chapter 7?
Answer: Yes.
Analysis:
If payment is not made and estate is liquidated in Chapter 7:
Debt
$70,000 mortgage
$50,000 mortgage
$50,000 other creditors

Property
$100,000
$ 30,000 (other assets)

After liquidation of the mortgaged property and payment of the $20,000
shortfall by guarantor, the liquidation is concluded:
Debt
$50,000 other creditors
$20,000 guarantor claim
$70,000 total

Property
$30,000 (other assets,
including the
payment not made)

Creditors, including guarantor, receive three-sevenths of the claims, or
42.857% of their claims. Guarantor is 23.8% of $20,000 (or $4,760) worse off than
it was with payment. Therefore, because the payment resulted in $4,760 benefit to
the guarantor, the benefit under the court's actualanalysisis recoverable from the
fully secured first mortgage holder who did nothave a guarantor. The fully secured
status of the first mortgage holder is irrelevant if the payment made was from a
source other than the actual collateral for its mortgage claim. As the example
above shows, it is the benefit conferred by the bootstrapping of the second
mortgage holder into a more secure position (at the expense of the estate) that
causes the problem for the first mortgage holder with no guarantor.
There is a difference, however, ifthe first mortgage creditor receives payment
from actual collateral. If the first mortgage claim is reduced correspondingly with
a reduction of collateral value, the second mortgage holder and its guarantor are
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either not benefitted or do not derive a benefit additional to that which they would
receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation. 7 '
B. OtherDecisionsof Note on the Issue
Shortly after the Seventh Circuit's decision in Deprizio,the Sixth Circuit
reached a similar result. In Ray v. City Bank & Trust Co. (In re C-L Cartage
17 2
Co.),
the court held that recovery can be made from an outsider transferee for
transfers made during the extended preference period when the beneficiary of the
transfers is an insider creditor or insider guarantor.'
C-L Cartageinvolved a bank which loaned funds to insiders who subsequently
loaned money to the debtor corporation. A third insider then guaranteed both loans.
During the year preceding bankruptcy, several payments were made by the
corporate obligor to the insiders, who then paid the bank. Several payments were
made directly to the bank, thus reducing the insider's exposure.174 In reaching
its holding, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that insiders are
"creditors" within the meaning of section 547(b)(1), as opposed to equity
contributors, because they have a real or contingent claim against the debtor
corporation. 175 Because the payments to the bank discharged the debtor's liability
to the insider creditors, the payments to the bank
were preferential and, under the
76
court's analysis, recoverable from the bank.
The C-L Cartagecourt reasoned that payments to creditors are preferential to
insiders and the bank is the mediate transferee. 77 The payments, therefore, can
be recovered. The bank argued that its loans to the company were fully secured
and, therefore, it did not receive more than it would have in a liquidation as
required under section 547(b)(5). 7 s The court found that it is the insiderwho

171. See In re Prescott, 805 F.2d 719, 731 (7th Cir. 1986) (deciding that a second lienholder
realized appreciation in the value of its inventory collateral when an undersecured first lienholder on
the same inventory collateral offset the positive balance in debtors' bank account against the loan
during the preference period, and, therefore, the second lienholder received an avoidable indirect
preferential transfer to the extent of the appreciation in value of its collateral); Kapela v. Newman,
649 F.2d 887, 894 (lst Cir. 1981) (holding that "a guarantor does not receive a preference when a
debtor uses acorporate asset to reduce the size of acreditor's loan provided the asset is one in which
the creditor held aperfected security interest and is not available to general creditors."); Zimmerman
v. Pennsylvania (In re Rimmer Corp.), 80 B.R. 337, 340 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (concluding that "a
payment made to a secured claimant, the priority of whose security extends to at least the amount
of the payment made, is not preferential."); Mazer v. Aetna Fin. Co. (In re Zuni), 6 B.R. 449, 452
(Bankr. D.N.M. 1980) (finding that "payment of a secured claim is not apreference if such payment
is accompanied by the release of an equivalent value to the estate.").
172. 899 F.2d 1490 (6th Cir. 1990).
173. Id. at 1494-95.
174. Id. at 1491-92.
175. Id. at 1493.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1495.
178. Id. at 1493.
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must have defenses, not the bank."" The court remanded, however, to see if the
80
bank had defenses under section 550(b)(1). I
The Fifth Circuit has spoken directly (and, at the same time, indirectly) on the
issue of extended preference periods in TB. Westex Foods,Inc. v. FDIC(In re TB.
Westex Foods, Inc.). 81 Westex involved a Chapter 11 debtor-in-possession
("Westex") which sought recovery of an allegedly preferential transfer to Alaska
Continental Bank ("Alaska"). 182 The president of Westex ("Bond") was indebted
to Alaska, and Westex was indebted to the president.1 83 Alaska obtained a
judgment against Bond and served a writ of garnishment upon Westex (January,
1987).' Westex failed to answer the garnishment writ and Alaska confirmed a
default judgment against Westex for the entire judgment against Bond. 8 5 Alaska
then garnished Westex's bank accounts and received $37,743.60 toward the
judgment against Westex (November, 1987).186 Some four months later (more
than ninety days after receipt of the funds from the bank accounts), Westex filed
bankruptcy.8 7 During the bankruptcy
case, Alaska was declared insolvent, and
1 8
the FDIC was appointed receiver.
The bankruptcy court'8 9 found for Alaska, holding that the transfer occurred
in January 1987, when the original garnishment writ was served upon Westex, and
was therefore outside the maximum one-year preference period.'9 Moreover, the
court held that the transfer did not benefit Bond, the insider, because Westex
possessed an indemnity claim against Bond for any amount paid.' 9' Alternatively, the court reasoned that even if all other provisions of section 547(b) were met,
it would be inequitable to allow a one-year reachback period against a third party
creditor solely on the basis of the existence of a guarantor or insider.' 92 On
appeal, the District Court affirmed the bankruptcy court's judgment solely on the
basis that to allow Westex to recover from Alaska would be inequitable.' 3

179. Id. at 1495.
180. Id. Section 550(b)(1) provides that no recovery is available if the "transferee ... takes for
value, including satisfaction or securing of a present or antecedent debt, in goodfaith, "andwithout
knowledge of the voidability of transfer avoided." 11 U.S.C. § 550(b)(1) (1988) (emphasis added).
181.
950 F.2d 1187 (5th Cir. 1992).
182. Id. at 1188.
183. Id.
184. Id
185. Id. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 2413 for a similar result for failure to answer garnishment
interrogatories.
186. Westex, 950 F.2d at 1188.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. T.B. Westex Foods, Inc. v. Alaska Continental Bank (In re T.B. Westex Foods, Inc.), 96
B.R. 77 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989).
190. Id. at 80-81.
191. Id. at 80.
192. Id. at 81.
193. T.B. Westex Foods, Inc. v. Alaska Continental Bank (In re T.B. Westex Foods, Inc), Bankr.
No. 88-70099, Adv. No. 88-7023, 1990 WL 359063 (W.D. Tex. May 22, 1990).
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The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's judgment.'94
The court reasoned that the transfer took place upon the service of the writ of
garnishment served upon the bank, in which the funds were held within Westex's
bank accounts, within one year of the bankruptcy case.' 9 The court further
determined that the transfer did benefit Bond; the payment by Westex to Alaska
reduced Westex's debt to Bond, and it also reduced the claim of Alaska against
Bond. 9 Thus, Bond benefitted by the difference between the payment to Alaska
and the amount he would receive from Westex, on
account of his unsecured claim,
1 97
upon liquidation pursuant to section 547(b)(5).
Next, the Westex court determined that all elements of the preference were met
vis-a-vis Bond, but the remaining question was whether Westex could proceed
against Alaska.' 98 The court analyzed the two theories underlying the cases
which prohibit any extension of the reachback period against non-insider
creditors-the "two transfer" theory and the "equity" argument. 199
First, the court stated that two transfers arguably take place when there is an
insider/guarantor situation because two separate debts exist.2"' The court
determined that this case was different, however, because Westex's payment
represented only one obligation-Westex's debt to Bond.2' "Instead
of paying
' 20 2
Bond, Westex has simply paid a garnishor standing in Bond's shoes.
There is a problem with this urge to distinguish. Remember, Alaska had
procured a separate judgment against Westex for the full amount of the Bond
judgment. Therefore, the amount owed by Westex to Bond is irrelevant. The
seizure was not effected by a writ of garnishment seeking to enforce the Alaska
judgment against Bond, but against Westex, and therefore the liability of Westex
could not be limited by (or to) amounts due from Westex to Bond.
The court purported to resolve this problem by assuming that Westex owed
Bond at least the amount of the debt owed by Bond to Alaska (and also by Westex
to Alaska).23 The utilization of this assumption allowed the court to proceed
within its analysis, convinced that it is without logical pitfall. The court went on
to read section 550(a) as being unambiguous and requiring that recovery can be had
from either Bond or the initial transferee, Alaska.2°
Regarding the second theory, the supposed inequity of making the prudent
creditor who obtained a guarantor worse off than the imprudent creditor, the court

194.

1992).
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

T.B. Westex Foods, Inc. v. FDIC (In re T.B. Westex Foods, Inc.), 950 F.2d 1187 (5th Cir.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at

1191.
1192.
1192-93.
1193.
1193-94.
1194.

1194-95.

1994]

BANKRUPTCY

reiterated its distinguishment of the Westex/Alaska situation (payment by Westex
was only payment of its debt to Bond to the third party, Alaska) and other
situations. The concluding paragraph of the court's equitable argument is
exasperating to certain lower courts looking for guidance: "Alaska has not
demonstrated any sufficiently compelling equity to warrant deviation from the
statutory scheme, even assuming, arguendoonly, that in other contexts (e.g., the
insider-guarantor) such might be appropriate."20 5
According to the Supreme Court, "whatever equitable powers remain in the
bankruptcy courts must and can only be exercised within the confines of the
Bankruptcy Code." 2'0 And what of the supposed distinction that generates the
reservation by the court of embracing the prospect of equitable considerations
overriding (or warranting deviation from) an unambiguous statutory scheme?
Couldn't (shouldn't) Bond have argued (he is the one suffering as a result of
the avoidance of any payments by Westex to Alaska) that because Westex failed
to respond to the garnishment interrogatories, the payments from Westex were on
account of Alaska's judgment claim against Westex and were independent of any
claim of Bond against Westex? This argument yields analytical fruit in two ways.
First, it forces the court to analyze its supposed distinction. If Bond is correct, the
court erroneously concluded that payment to Alaska reduced both the obligation of
Bond to Alaska and the obligation of Westex to Bond.20 7 If the separate nature
of the Westex judgment is held in proper focus, it is clear to this writer that the
court should have faced the legal consequence of payment by Westex to Alaska
upon the debt of Westex to Bond as a question rather than an assumption.
Second, recall that the court assumes (without facts of record) that the debt of
Westex to Bond was at least equal to the debt of Bond to Alaska. What if it wasn't?
Before the judgment, Westex could only owe Alaska what it owed Bond, and if the
interrogatories had been answered, and liability to Alaska thereby limited, the
court's analysis (payment to Alaska is equivalent to payment to Bond) would have
been more clearly correct. To the extent liability was assumed by Westex over and
above the amount owed by Westex to Bond, the incurring of the indebtedness under
the judgment could have been attacked under section 548(a)(2) as a fraudulent
transfer. 0 8 Actions under section 548 have a one-year reachback period,

205. Id. at 1195.
206. Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206, 108 S. Ct. 963, 969 (1988).
207. Westex, 950 F.2d at 1194. If Westex has incurred this separate obligation upon its failure
to answer garnishment interrogatories, Bond will argue on behalf of his claim against Westex that
it is not reduced; the fact that Alaska has no right to be paid twice does not yield the legal or logical
conclusion that Westex can avoid paying twice.
208. Section 548(a)(2) reads:
(a) The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property, or any
obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or within one year before
the date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily(2)(A) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer
or obligation; and
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regardless of insider involvement. Failure to resort to facts of record to resolve this
issue could be a problem. Recall that the payment must be to or for the benefit of
a creditor to be avoidable under section 547. Any payment by Westex over and
above what was owed to Bond cannot be seen as having been paid to or for the
benefit of Bond as a creditor (only to or for the benefit of the creditor, Alaska).
Because the lower courts in Westex had not addressed the extent to which the
insider benefitted from the transfer, the Court of Appeals remanded for further
proceedings. 2 9
The Fifth Circuit recently revisited the insider/non-insider preference period
dichotomy in Southmark Corp. v. Southmark PersonalStorage, Inc. (In re
Southmark Corp.). 210 In Southmark, a subsidiary of Southmark Corporation,
Southmark Personal Storage, Inc. ("SPS"), borrowed two million dollars from First
Nationwide Bank ("FNB").2 ' SPS pledged severalpromissory notes as collateral
to secure the FNB loan.212 In addition, Southmark guaranteed all of SPS's debt
to FNB.213 The guaranty agreement did not require FNB first to seek recovery
from SPS before collecting from Southmark." 4 Approximately seven months
before Southmark filed for bankruptcy, it transferred $222,000 to FNB in payment
for collateral notes on which SPS was in default." 5 Southmark, as debtor-inpossession, subsequently sought to recover the payment as a preferential transfer
from both SPS and FNB.216

Southmark's complaint was dismiss by the bankruptcy court for failure to
allege to state the necessary elements of a preference pursuant to section 547(b)( 1)
and (2).17 The bankruptcy court found that "Southmark's payment did not
benefit SPS 'for or on account of an antecedent debt,' ... because Southmark was
not indebted to SPS on the guaranty underlying the transfer to FNB.""s On
appeal, the district court affirmed the dismissal. 2 9

(B)(i) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such obligation was
incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such transfer or obligation;
(ii) was engaged in business or a transaction, or was about to engage in business or
a transaction, for which any property remaining with the debtor was an unreasonably
small capital; or
(iii) intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would incur, debts that would be
beyond the debtor's ability to pay as such debts matured.
11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1988).
209. Westex, 950 F.2d at 1195.
210. 993 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1993).
211. Id. at 118.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 119 (citing Southmark Corp. v. Southmark Personal Storage, Inc. (In re Southmark
Corp.), 138 B.R. 831, 835 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992)).
219. Id. at 121.
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In its analysis, the Fifth Circuit strictly construed the language of section
547(b) and determined that the antecedent debt for which the transfer is made
(Southmark's guaranty obligation) must be the same debt which gives rise to the
insider creditor's (SPS's) claim.22 The court stated, "[tihe transfer must do more
than incidentally benefit inside creditor SPS; 22 ' the transfer must benefit SPS in
'
relation to the antecedent debt that triggered the transfer."222
Apparently SPS was
agreement. 223
guaranty
the
to
unrelated
claims
on
a creditor of Southmark
The Southmark court illustrated the differences between the facts in Southmark
and those in Westex. The court noted that in Westex, "Alaska had a claim against
Westex solely because of Alaska's right to enforce Bond's claim under garnishment
law. 224 Therefore, the only "antecedent debt" was Westex's debt to Bond.225
Unlike Westex, however, the claims of SPS against Southmark were independent
from the guaranty agreement which generated payment to FNB.
The Southmark court referred to the Seventh Circuit's analysis in Depriziothat
for the one-year preference period to apply under section 547(b), "the insider must
be a creditor in connection with the debt underlying the transfer,,226 as additional
support for its position. The expanded preferential period applied in Deprizio
because the insider was also the guarantor of the debtor/obligor's debt to the noninsider creditor upon which payments were made, and consequently the debtor's
payments on such debt directly reduced the insider's liability on the guaranty
(dollar for dollar) and therefore the claim of the insider against the debtor. 227

220. Id. at 119. The court particularly focused on the language of § 547(b)(5), which provides
that atrustee may avoid a transfer "to or for the benefit of a creditor" ((b)(1)), "for or on account of
an antecedent debt" ((b)(2))(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive if(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent provided by the
provisions of this title.
11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5) (1988) (emphasis added).
221. Although SPS was a creditor of Southmark, SPS's claim was not related to Southmark's
guaranty obligation to FNB. Southmark, 993 F.2d at 119.

222.
223.

Id.
Id.

224. Id.(discussing In re T.B. Westex Foods, Inc.. 950 F.2d 1187 (5th Cir. 1992). See
disagreement with this perception supra at pp. 71-73.
225. Southmark, 993 F.2d at 119 (discussing In re T.B. Westex Foods, Inc., 950 F.2d 1187 (5th
Cir. 1992).
226. Id. at 120 (citing Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp. (In re V.N. Deprizio Constr. Co., 874
F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989)) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). See also Hendon v. Associates
Commercial Corp. (In re Fastrans, Inc.), 142 B.R. 241, 245 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1992) (following
Deprizio and concluding that "it isnot enough that an insider be acreditor of the debtor in a general
sense; the insider must have a 'claim' against the debtor attributable to the specific debt he or she
guaranteed in order to render transfers made by the debtor on account of that debt to the non-insider
transferee avoidable under § 547(b).").
227. See discussion supra at pp. 56-58. The Southmark court distinguished the facts before it
from those in Deprizio by pointing out that "[the] payments to the lenders [in Deprizio] were 'for
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In contrast, as SPS could not derive creditor status upon default by Southmark,
the fact that SPS was a creditor with regard to unrelated obligations was seen by the
court to be irrelevant. Though the court mentioned that payment by Southmark
benefitted SPS (by reducing its principal obligor exposure),2 28 SPS derived no
benefit on account of a claim against Southmark arising from the guaranty
agreement. While benefit to the insider by means of reduction of the insider's
exposure is part of the equation, that benefit must simultaneously bestow a benefit
vis-a-vis the debtor's obligation to the insider. While reduction of a guarantor's
exposure on a guaranty by means of payment by the principal obligor has the
simultaneous effect of reducing the guarantor's claim against the principal obligor,
payment by the guarantor generates a claim against, as opposed to a benefit upon,
the principal obligor.
The court also analyzed the similarities between the SPS-Southmark
relationship and the insiders who derived benefit in Depriziofrom payments made
by the debtor of tax obligations. 29 While payment of the tax obligations reduced
the insider's exposure to responsible party liability to the IRS, the payments did not
benefit the insider as creditor because the insider possessed no entitlement, through
subrogation or otherwise, to a corresponding claim against the debtor arising from
payments on account of responsible party liability.230 Because payments to the
bank did not benefit the insider on account of creditor status arising from the same
(guaranty) transaction establishing the obligation pursuant to which the payments
were made, the transfers were not avoidable as to either SPS or FNB as preferential
transfers. The rule espoused is that "the transfer must benefit SPS in relation to the
antecedent debt that triggered the transfer."23'
From this writer's simple-minded figuring of the relationships, it appears clear
that payment by Southmark, the guarantor, in fact gave rise to a claim by
Southmark against SPS-the exact opposite of the relationship as was dealt with
in Deprizio(guarantor was non-debtor). In this case, the holder of the contingent
claim is the debtor. Therefore, with respect to the antecedent debt triggering the
transfer, it is clear that the insider derived no benefit. The overall debt was not in
fact reduced, only shifted. The balance over and above the payment remains owed
to the bank, and the amount of the payment, by the guarantor's right of subrogation,
is owed by the insider to the guarantor.
Perhaps, however, there is another way of looking at the question of benefit
derived by the insider; one not mentioned by the court. The court makes reference
to the "incidental benefit" obtained by SPS from the transfer, but does not delineate
the nature of the incidental benefit. 232 Resort to the bankruptcy court opinion

the benefit' of the insider (§ 547(b)(1)), because those payments reduced the insider's exposure on
the guaranty." Southmark, 993 F.2d at 120 (citing Deprizio, 874 F.2d at 1190).
228. Id. at 121.
* 229. Id. at 120.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 119.
232. Id.
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yields the observation that Southmark alleged in its complaint "that the transfer was
made 'for the benefit of SPS' because the transfer 'reduced the amount owed by
SPS to FNB."'233 In concluding its analysis, the bankruptcy court states:
As a result of the transfer to FNB, SPS did not receive a greater percentage of its claim against Southmark had the transfer not been made. SPS
had no claim against Southmark that was reduced by the transfer. The
transfer had no effect on the SPS claim based on the intercompany
transfer. While SPS received a benefit from the transfer, it did not receive
a benefit or payment based on or on account of its claim against
Southmark.234
The Fifth Circuit does not provide much discussion regarding the connexity
between the payment by Southmark and the unrelated claim of SPS, relying upon
statutory language and the support of Deprizio for the rule espoused.235 Therefore, the court arguably deemed irrelevant the concern with the extent to which SPS
derived a benefit on account of its unrelated claim from the payment (preferring to
announce the rule that the insider must be a creditor in connection with the
obligation triggering the transfer-that's it, nothing further need be asked).
What of the bankruptcy court's observation, though? Recall that the payment
by Southmark generated a claim by Southmark against SPS. Prior to the payment,
SPS is (apparently) an unsecured creditor destined to share, pro rata, in the assets
of the debtor, Southmark. What about after the payment? Functionally, the asset
pool of Southmark numerically remains the same-the payment is converted into
a claim for a like amount of dollars against SPS. Prior to the Southmark payment,
SPS could assert an unsecured, pro rata,claim to the dollars which came to make
up the payment. After the payment, however, SPS conceivably could assert a
securedclaim to the extent of 236
the claim of Southmark against it under section
506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.

233. Southmark Corp. v. Southmark Personal Storage, Inc. (In re Southmark Corp.), 138 B.R.
831, 833 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992).
234. Id. at 835.
235. Southmark, 993 F.2d at 120.
236. Section 506(a) reads:
(a) An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate has
an interest, or that is subject to setoff under section 553 of this title, is a secured claim
to the extent of the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such
property, or to the extent of the amount subject to setoff, as the case may be, and is an
unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor's interest or the amount so
subject to setoff is less than the amount of such allowed claim. Such value shall be
determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use
of such property, and in conjunction with any hearing on such disposition or use or on
a plan affecting such creditor's interest.
11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988).
More proud than embarrassed (that I didn't think of it), this writer owes (and gladly pays) specific
citation to one of his students, Hansel M. Harlan, not for planting the seed of this argument, but for
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The concept is not difficult. The creditor, SPS, upon Southmark obtaining a
claim against it through subrogation, can argue that under applicable nonbankruptcy law, it possesses a right to setoff (or compensation) that secures its
claim against Southmark to the extent of the debt that it owes Southmark.2"
Because SPS has obtained a secured claim (on account of its unrelated claim
against Southmark) as a result of the payments by Southmark to the bank, the
argument of Southmark is that SPS in fact received a direct benefit on account of
its claim (within a year prior to bankruptcy), and, therefore, the payment is at least
preferential as to SPS. Once this step is established, why wouldn't the bank, as
initial transferee, owe the preference?
Clearly, the bankruptcy court opinion was incorrect in its vehement pronouncements about the absence of a benefit bestowed upon SPS as a result of the
payments.23 Was the Fifth Circuit also incorrect in not addressing this argument? Probably not incorrect, though analysis perhaps would have more
completely stitched its quilt.
The problem with the posed argument is section 553 of the Bankruptcy Code
and its purpose, as interpreted by the jurisprudence. 239 Section 553 is the specific

advancing it, pretty well full-blown, within a classroom discussion during the fall semester, 1993.
237. For a discussion of the necessity of possessing a right to setoff under applicable nonbankruptcy law, see 4 Collier on Bankruptcy, supra note 20, 1 553.06, at 553-38 to 42. In Louisiana,
the term "setoff" approximates the Law of Compensation. See La. Civ. Code arts. 1893-1902.
238. See supra at p. 78.
239. Section 553 reads as follows:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section and in sections 362 and 363 of this
title, this title does not affect any right of a creditor to offset a mutual debt owing by such
creditor to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title
against a claim of such creditor against the debtor that arose before the commencement
of the case, except to the extent that(1) the claim of such creditor against the debtor is disallowed other than under
section 502(b)(3) of this title;
(2) such claim was transferred, by an entity other than the debtor, to such
creditor(A) after the commencement of the case; or
(B)(i) after 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; and
(ii) while the debtor was insolvent; or
(3) the debt owed to the debtor by such creditor was incurred by such creditor(A) after 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition;
(B) while the debtor was insolvent; and
(C) for the purpose of obtaining a right of setoff against the debtor.
(b)(1) Except with respect to a setoff of a kind described in section 362(b)(6),
362(b)(7), 362(b)(14),, [sic] 365(h)(2), or 365(i)(2) of this title, if a creditor offsets a
mutual debt owing to the debtor against a claim against the debtor on or within 90 days
before the date of the filing of the petition, then the trustee may recover from such
creditor the amount so offset to the extent that any insufficiency on the date of such setoff
is less than the insufficiency on the later of(A) 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; and
(B) the first date during the 90 days immediately preceding the date of the filing
of the petition on which there is an insufficiency.
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provision of the Code which provides the right on behalf of the trustee (or debtorin-possession) to avoid setoffs.24"
In fact, section 553 evidences congressional intent to exclude setoffs (or the
right to setoff) from avoidance unless the requirements of section 553 are met.2 4,
Because section 553 has only a ninety-day reachback period, setoffs (or the right
to obtain setoffs) that occur (or accrue) earlier than ninety days before the
bankruptcy petition are not affected by section 553. Therefore, while a superficially plausible argument, the accrual of a right of setoff (accrued claim by means of
the right to setoff) before ninety days prior to the bankruptcy case does not involve
a preferential transfer to the insider creditor. Technically, then, the Fifth Circuit is
correct (and the Southmark bankruptcy court would have been correct, as well, if
the tenor of the observations would have been to the effect that while SPS
benefitted from the payments, the benefit was not avoidable).
Most recently, the Ninth Circuit, in a case of first impression in that circuit,
relied upon the Deprizioand Southmark opinions to reach its judgment that a
trustee may recover from an outside creditor a transfer made within one year of
bankruptcy, where the transfer benefits an inside guarantor.2 42 In In re Sufolla,
Inc., the debtor entered into a loan agreement with the bank which was guaranteed
by some of the debtor's shareholders.243 Sometime in the year preceding the
filing of the bankruptcy petition, but outside the ninety-day period, the debtor made
a payment on the loan to the bank.244 The official unsecured creditors committee
initiated an adversary proceeding and sought to recover the payment as a

(2) In this subsection, "insufficiency" means amount, if any, by which a claim against
the debtor exceeds a mutual debt owing to the debtor by the holder of such claim.
(c) For the purposes of this section, the debtor is presumed to have been insolvent on
and during the 90 days immediately preceding the date of the filing of the petition.
11 U.S.C. § 553 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (footnotes omitted).
240. Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Exxon Co., USA, 814 F.2d 1030, 1034 (5th Cir. 1987).
241.
Id. at 1034-35. See also In re Morgan, 77 B.R. 81, 84 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1987) (holding
that "[a] valid setoff may not be recovered as a preferential transfer for that would defeat the intended
purpose of the setoff provisions of the Bankruptcy Code."); Brooks Farms v. USDA (In re Brooks
Farms), 70 B.R. 368, 372-73 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1987) (finding that setoff rights are controlled under
§ 553 and not preference law); Tradex, Inc. v. United States (In re IML Freight, Inc.), 65 B.R. 788,
791-92 (Bankr. D. Utah 1986) (same); Quinn v. Montrose State Bank (In re Intermountain Porta
Storage, Inc.), 59 B.R. 793, 795 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1986), appeal dismissed, affd, 74 B.R. 1011 (D.
Colo. 1987); Eckles v. Petco, Inc., Interstate (In re Balducci Oil Co.), 33 B.R. 847, 852 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 1983); 4 Collier on Bankruptcy, supra note 20, 1 553.02, at 553-9 to 14.
242. Official Unsecured Creditors Comm. of Suffolla, Inc. v. U.S. Nat'l Bank of Oregon (In re
Sufolla, Inc.), 2 F.3d 977, 979-80 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing In re T.B. Westex Foods, Inc., 950 F.2d
1187 (5th Cir. 1992) (benefit to garnishee's insider); Southmark Corp. v. Southmark Personal Storage,
Inc. (In re Southmark Corp.), 993 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1993); Ray v. City Bank and Trust Co. (In re
C-L Cartage Co.), 899 F.2d 1490 (6th Cir. 1990); Manufacturers Hanover Leasing Corp. v. Lowrey
(In re Robinson Bros. Drilling, Inc.), 892 F.2d 850 (10th Cir. 1989); Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin.
Corp. (In re V.N. Deprizio Constr. Co.), 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989)).
243. Suffolla, 2 F.3d at 978.
244. Id.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

preferential transfer.245 The bankruptcy court held that the transfer was a
preference recoverable from the bank, and the district court affirmed.246
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the guarantors of the debtor's loan agreement
were insider creditors within the meaning of section 547(b).247 The Sufolla court
declined to depart from a literal reading of section 547248 and rejected any
equitable arguments made in support of protecting the non-insider creditor.249
Moreover, the court rejected the "two transfer" theory advanced by the bank.250
The Ninth Circuit embraced the Deprizio opinion in determining that a single
transfer takes place when the debtor makes a payment to the outside creditor which
happens to benefit two parties.251
Accordingly, the Sufolla court concluded that the payment by the debtor to the
bank reduced the insiders' liability25 2 and benefitted the insiders as creditors
because the insiders' contingent claims against the debtor were connected directly
to the debt owed to the bank. 253 Thus, because section 550 unambiguously
permits recovery from an initial transferee,254 the payment was recoverable from
the bank in accordance
with the extended preference period of section
255
547(b)(4)(B).
Clearly, the tide has gone out on the two-transfer theory within the majority of
circuits from which reported decisions have emanated (with the Fifth Circuit having
tantalized with a dance around the issue, but as of yet exuding uncertainty). Given
the exposure inherent in the Deprizioanalysis, whether or not recognized and

245. Id. at 978-79.
246. Id. at 979.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 981.
249. Id. at 980-81 (citing C-L Cart6ge,899 F.2d at 1494 (holding that bankruptcy courts cannot
disregard unambiguous statutory language in the name of equity) (citing Norwest Bank Worthington
v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206, 108 S. Ct. 963, 969 (1988)); Deprizio, 874 F.2d at 1197 (questioning
the premise that recovery against an outside lender is inequitable); Zolg v. Kelly (In re Kelly), 841
F.2d 908, 913 n.4 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Bankruptcy judges have no more power than any others to ignore
the plain language of a statute in order to reach a result more in keeping with their notions of
equity."); Robinson Bros., 97 B.R. at 82 ("The equitable powers of the bankruptcy court under
Section 105 to avoid strict construction of the Code is limited.")).
250. Id. at 981-82.
251. Id. (citing Deprizio, 874 F.2d at 1195-96 (rejecting the two transfers theory); C-L Cartage,
899 F.2d at 1494-95).
252.
Although the bank was fully secured at the time of the debtor's payment, it was only
partially secured on the date the bankruptcy petition was filed. Sufolla, 2 F.3d at 985. Accordingly,
the insider guarantors did receive a benefit within the meaning of § 547(b)(1). Id. The Sufolla court
noted, however, that a different result may have been reached if the bank remained a fully secured
creditor at the time the bankruptcy petition was filed. Id. (citing Miller v. Rausch-Alan, Inc. (In re
Gamest, Inc.), 129 B.R. 179, 182 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991) (holding that the debtor's prepetition
payments to a fully secured creditor did not benefit the insider guarantors because the insiders would
have been subrogated to a fully secured claim)).
253. Sufolla, 2 F.3d at 983 n.7.
254. Id. at 983.
255. Id. at 986.
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admitted by the court itself, what options are available to lenders' lawyers to avoid
the Deprizio tarpit?
The most obvious response (offthe top of my head) is a waiver of subrogation
rights by the insider guarantor. The insider guarantor who possesses no corresponding claim against the principal obligor arising from the act of guaranty would
not be a creditor of the principal obligor, and, therefore, payments to the noninsider creditor by the debtor would not be to or for the benefit of a creditor.256
Note the ironical consequence of this possible means of escape.
Recall that the Depriziocourt stridently disagreed with the notion that
expanding the preference period against the non-insider is inequitable on the basis
that insiders are in the position to determine who gets paid first (an insider who is
a guarantor of the non-insider claim will want the guaranty exposure limited).257
By requiring a waiver of subrogation rights, isn't the non-insider creditor providing
a greater incentive for the insider to insure that the creditor whose debt is
guaranteed gets paid first? Waiver of subrogation rights. in no way lessens the
guarantor's exposure on the guaranty, but only purports to extinguish the
guarantor's contingent claim against the debtor, thereby obviating any hope of any
recovery by the guarantor on account of payments made. So the equitable
quandary: the creditor who obtains a waiver of subrogation rights creates a greater
incentive for inequitable conduct on the part of the insider (and debtor). Simultaneously, the waiver is designed to insulate the non-insider from an expanded
preference period by depriving the insider-guarantor of creditor status.25
Another approach observed by this writer is the suspension by contract of
subrogation rights, so that the right of the guarantor to assert a claim against the
debtor does not arise (or is suspended) until the passage of at least 366 days after
each payment made under the guaranty agreement.
A third circumvention might be a reduced guaranty (e.g., principal obligation
($3,000,000), guaranteed portion is ($1,000,000)) subject to an imputation of
payments agreement among the debtor, creditor, and guarantor that payments made
by the debtor to the creditor are first imputed to the non-guaranteed portion of the
debt. 9

256. See Deprizio, 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989); Southmark Corp. v. Southmark Personal
Storage, Inc. (In re Southmark Corp.), 993 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1993).
257. Deprizio, 874 F.2d at 1198. See supra at pp. 57-58.
258. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the concerns, related to this writer by
numerous attorneys, that a required waiver of subrogation rights is against public policy and thereby
non-enforceable. See La. Civ. Code arts. 2029-2034 (relating to nullity of contracts). For cases
dealing with the question, and which approved waivers of subrogation under applicable state law and
thereby excepted the non-insider creditor from the effect of the extended preference period, see
Hostmann v. First Interstate Bank of Oregon, N.A. (In re XTI XONIX Technologies, Inc.), 156 B.R.
821 (Bankr. D. Or. 1993) (Oregon law); Hendon v. Associates Commercial Corp. (In re Fastrans,
Inc.), 142 B.R. 241 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1992) (Tennessee law).
259. See La. Civ. Code arts. 1864-1868. This mechanism, functionally, would place only the
last part of the loan in danger of the extended preference reachback period.
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Whatever avenues are available to bank lawyers, it appears that they have
proven, in the final analysis, to be too tedious. Pending legislation, if passed, will
overrule Deprizio and its disciples. The legislation in its present form reads:
SEC. 214. LIMITATION ON LIABILITY OF NONINSIDER TRANSFEREE FOR AVOIDED TRANSFER.
Section 550 of title 11, United States Code, is amended(1) by redesignating subsections (b), (c), (d), and (e) as subsections
(c), (d), (e), and (f), respectively; and
(2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new subsection:
"(b) The trustee may recover under subsection (a) a transfer avoided
under section 547(b) from a first transferee or an immediate or mediate
transferee of a first transferee only to the extent that"(1) all the elements of section 547(b) are satisfied as to the first
transferee; and
"(2)
the exceptions in section 547(c) do not protect the first transfer60
ee.

, 2,

This pending legislation, however, even if promulgated, will not for some time
render Deprizioobsolete. The proposed legislation contains an effective date
provision which provides, in pertinent part, that "the amendment made by this Act
shall not apply with respect to cases commenced under Title 11, United States
Code, before the date of enactment of this Act."26'
Because a trustee has until the earlier of two years after the appointment of the
trustee or the time the case is closed or dismissed within which to bring a
preference action, it is likely that the Deprizio argument/analysis will remain
applicable to all cases filed up through the day before the amendment to section 550
(if enacted) is enacted.262

260. S. Rep. No. 540, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., § 214 (1993).
261. S. Rep. No. 540, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., § 602 (1993).
262. 11 U.S.C. § 546(a)(1) and (2) (1988). Section 546, on its face, proposes to limit only the
period in which a trustee can bring an avoidance action. In fact, some courts have limited the
applicability of § 546 to actions by trustees so as to effectively free debtors-in-possession from any
time constraint. See Korvettes, Inc. v. Sanyo Elec., Inc. (In re Korvettes, Inc.), 67 B.R. 730
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (concluding that the two-year statute of limitations applicable to trustee avoidance
actions does not apply to preference actions brought by debtors-in-possession); Saccurato v. Shawmut
Bank, N.A. (In re Mars Stores, Inc.), 150 B.R. 869, 877 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1993); Cardullo v. Dwyer
Mechanical Corp. (In re Cardullo), 142 B.R. 138 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1992); Freedom Ford, Inc. v. Sun
Bank & Trust Co. (In re Freedom Ford, Inc.), 140 B.R. 585 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992); Pate v. Hunt
(In re Hunt), 136 B.R. 437 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991); In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 136 B.R. 396
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991). aff'd, 145 B.R. 823 (W.D. Pa. 1992); Pullman Constr. Indus., Inc. v.
National Steel Serv. Center (In re Pullman Constr. Indus., Inc.), 132 B.R. 359 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1991); United States Lines (S.A.), Inc. v. United States (In re McLean Indus., Inc.), 132 B.R. 247
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991), aff'd, 162 B.R. 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Mancuso v. Continental Bank Nat'l
Ass'n Chicago (In re Topcor, Inc.), 132 B.R. 119 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991); Katon v. International
Bank of Miami, N.A. (In re Tamiami Range & Gun Shop, Inc.), 130 B.R. 617 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1991); Caplan v. United States Brass & Copper Co. (In re Century Brass Prods., Inc.), 127 B.R. 720
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III. CONCLUSION

The authors of this article are thankful for the opportunity to participate in this
symposium. Upon reflection, it appears that we have offered much talk on few
developments. In so doing, we have attempted first to offer an analysis of a recent
bankruptcy issue with non-bankruptcy implications. Second, we have ventured to
chart an important development in the law of preferences, which, though it may be
rendered obsolete ifpending legislation is passed, shall remain relevant for at least
the foreseeable future.

(Bankr. D. Conn. 1991); Perlstein v. Saltzstein (In re AOV Indus., Inc.), 62 B.R. 968 (Bankr. D.D.C.
1986); Alithochrome Corp. v. East Coast Finishing Sales Corp. (In re Alithochrome Corp.), 53 B.R.
906 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985); Boatman v. E.J. Davis Corp. (In re Choice Vend, Inc.), 49 B.R. 719
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1985).
The alternative line of authority interprets § 546 as applicable to both trustees and debtors-inpossession, effectively limiting the period within which any party may bring an avoidance action.
See Zilkha Energy Co. v. Leighton, 920 F.2d 1520, 1524 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that the two-year
statute of limitations in § 546(a) applied to the filing of apreference action by adebtor-in-possession
where a trustee had not been appointed), affd afterremand,999 F.2d 548 (10th Cir. 1993); Sparmal
Enters., Inc. v. Moffit Realty Corp. (In re Sparmal Enters., Inc.), 126 B.R. 559, 562-63 (S.D. Ind.
1991) (same); Knapp v. Applewhite (In re Knapp), 146B.R. 294, 296 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992);
Construction Mgt. Servs., Inc. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. (In re Coastal Group, Inc.), 125
B.R. 730, 732 (Bankr. D. Del. 1991); Lill v. Bricker (In re Lill), 116 B.R. 543, 546 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1990).
The middle path between these two roads deals with the situation of conversion of a case to a case
under another chapter (e.g., Chapter 11 to Chapter 7), and the effect of conversion upon the
applicable limitation period. See Smith v. Moody (In re Moody), 77 B.R. 566, 573-74 (S.D. Tex.
1987) (holding that § 546(a)'s statute of limitations begins anew following conversion of a
proceeding from one chapter to another and appointment of a new trustee), affd on othergrounds,
862 F.2d 1194 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1562 (1992); Daff v. Regal Recovery, Inc.
(In re Continental Capital & Credit, Inc.), 158 B.R. 828, 830 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1993) (same);
Amazing Enters. v. Jobin (In re M & L Business Machs., Inc.), 153 B.R. 308, 310-11 (D. Colo.),
affd, 160 B.R. 850 (D. Colo. 1993); Roberts v. Seneca Petroleum Co. (In re Wikel Mfg. Co.), 153
B.R. 183, 185 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993); Martino v. Assco Assocs., Inc. (In re SSS Enters., Inc.), 145
B.R. 915,917 (Bankr. N.D. Il1. 1992); Pongetti v. Lee (In re Bingham Sys., Inc.), 139 B.R. 809, 81213 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1991); Nichols v. Wood (In re Wood), 113 B.R. 253, 255 (Bankr. S.D. Miss.
1990) (conversion of chapter 13 proceeding to chapter 7 proceeding); Zeisler v. Conn. Bank & Trust
Co. (In re Grambling), 85 B.R. 675, 676-77 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1988); Stuart v. Pingree (In re Afco
Dev. Corp.), 65 B.R. 781, 787 (Bankr. D. Utah 1986); see also Mahoney, Trocki & Assocs., Inc. v.
Kunzman (In re Mahoney, Trocki & Assocs., Inc.), I11 B.R. 914 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1990); Jet
Florida, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc. (In re Jet Florida Sys., Inc.), 73 B.R. 552 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1987); Edleman v. Gleason (In re Silver Mill Frozen Foods, Inc.), 23 B.R. 179 (Bankr. W.D. Mich.
1982). But see Ford v. Union Bank (In re San Joaquin Roast Beef), 7 F.3d 1413, 1415-16 (9th Cir.
1993) (interpreting § 546(a) to mean that the two-year statute of limitations begins running from the
date the first trustee is appointed and that all subsequent trustees are subject to the same two-year

period).

